Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
10-7-2016 12:00 AM

Regulating for Resilience: Principled Flexibility and Environmental
Co-Management in the Mackenzie Valley
Heather L. Potter, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Professor Sara Seck, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Laws degree in
Law
© Heather L. Potter 2016

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Potter, Heather L., "Regulating for Resilience: Principled Flexibility and Environmental Co-Management in
the Mackenzie Valley" (2016). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 4267.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4267

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

i

Abstract
The author examines the environmental regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley
region of the Northwest Territories which includes the regulatory structure
established by the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act and the private
contractual instruments of environmental agreements, impact benefit agreements and
socio-economic agreements. The author concludes that these instruments work
together to form a complex regulatory system that is sometimes maladapted to the
adaptive management framework necessary for effective regulation in an increasingly
unstable arctic environment. The author argues that effective environmental
management in the Mackenzie Valley requires a regulatory approach grounded in
principled flexibility and shared environmental goals across a multiplicity of
instruments. The Mackenzie Valley region is better suited than other regions to
develop this approach due to its history of integrated resource management and comanagement with Aboriginal people and because of the protections provided to
Aboriginal rights by Section 35 of the Canadian constitution.

Keywords
Resource management; environmental regulation; resilience theory; adaptive
management; Mackenzie Valley; co-management; impact benefits agreements;
socio-economic agreements; environmental agreements, climate change.
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CHAPTER 1
1

Introduction
“First Nations are Canadians last, best hope of protecting the land,

water, sky and plants and animals for their future generations as
well.”1
The Canadian arctic is one of the most enigmatic regions on earth. This thesis
focuses on the challenges of environmental regulation in northern Canada and
suggests that some of the strategies developed in the arctic regions, particularly in

the Mackenzie Valley region of the Northwest Territories (NWT), have the potential
to assist regulators south of the 60th parallel.
This thesis accepts that climate change is a true environmental and social challenge,
and the effects of climate change are felt disproportionately in the arctic. In 2004,
the Ministers of the Arctic Council, an international body made up of representatives
from arctic nations, released the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA).2 More
than 250 scientists and six circumpolar Indigenous peoples organizations
participated in the ACIA, and the results of the study are disconcerting.
The ACIA confirmed that the arctic climate is warming rapidly, and that this is likely
to result in large scale environmental consequences with global implications. This
includes large scale and irreversible changes to the arctic terrain including shifting
arctic vegetation zones with forests replacing existing tundra and tundra vegetation
moving into polar deserts; Melting permafrost will significantly alter existing
wetlands. The ACIA predicted significant changes in animal species’ diversity,
Dr. Pam Palmater as quoted by Wab Kinew in his essay “Idle No More is Not Just an Indian Thing”
reproduced in John Ralston Saul, The Comeback (Toronto: Penguin Canada Books, 2014) at 252.
2 AMAB, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The
members of the Arctic Council are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and
the United States. Permanent Indigenous participants include the Aleut International Association,
Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.
1
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ranges and distribution. In particular, the ACIA identified a major decline in arctic
marine species such as polar bears, seals, walrus and some marine birds. Elevated
ultraviolet radiation levels will affect people, plants and animals. The ACIA also
noted that climate change is likely to have major economic and cultural impacts for
Indigenous communities living in the Arctic.3 Since the release of the ACIA, the
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) associated with the Arctic
Council have released related studies that support these findings.4 These findings
inform and are consistent with scientific studies done by the Government of the
Northwest Territories.5
Of particular importance to the Dene people in the Mackenzie Valley is the rapid
decline of the caribou population. The caribou herd is a key source of sustenance
and cultural meaning to the Dene people.6 The importance of caribou is described by
the Sahtu Dene as follows:
“If one thing could be singled out that binds the people of DA@line most strongly to
their land and heritage, it would be caribou. Many traditional stories show the
wisdom and character of the caribou. The caribou have always been a staple of Dene
subsistence and its seasonal migrations have determined people’s movements on
the land.” 7
All of these factors, including the decline of the caribou, are irrevocably altering the
physical and social landscape of the north. This thesis looks at strategies for
AMAB, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment –Executive Summary (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) at 10-11.
4 AMAP released in 2015: (1) Freshwater Systems in a Changing Climate and (2) Human Health in the
Arctic and in 2016: (1) Methane as an Arctic Climate Forcer and (2) Black Carbon and Ozone as an
Arctic Climate Forcer which are available on their website at www.amap.no .
5 In 2008, the Government of the Northwest Territories released its Climate Change Report. That
Report relies heavily on the findings in the ACIA and notes that the climate change impacts identified
in the NWT report are consistent with the ACIA. GNWT, NWT Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation
Report (2008) available online at
www.enr.gov.nt.ca/sites/default/reports/nwt_climate_change_impacts_and_adaptation_report.pdf at
6.
6
Liv Solveig Vors and Mark Stephen Boyce, “Global Declines of Caribou and Reindeer” (2009) 15 Global
Change Biology 11 at 2626-2633; For a discussion of the cultural importance of caribou to the Tlicho Dene
see Allice Legat “Walking the Land, Feeding the Fire: Knowledge and Stewardship Among the Tlicho
Dene” (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012) at 83-85.
7 Taken from their website of the Deline First Nation at www.deline.ca/culture-andcommunity/deline-stories/importance-of-caribou (2016).
3
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effective environmental regulation in a unique and challenging time characterized
by uncertainty of the natural and social world. It argues that the status given to
Aboriginal and Treaty rights under Section 35 of the Constitution provides
additional environmental protections that will be important in fighting climate
change, and that supporting and enabling Aboriginal people to exercise their
traditional role in stewardship of the land is an important component in
encouraging effective and resilient environmental management.
This thesis examines the regulatory regime operating in the Mackenzie Valley region
of the Northwest Territories and its ability to effectively regulate a “new north”
characterized by environmental and social instability. It defines the regulatory
regime to include both the environmental legislative scheme, predominately the
Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (MVRMA) 8 and its related comanagement board structures, and contractual agreements. The types of
contractual agreements reviewed in this paper are environmental agreements that
are directly concerned with environmental impacts, impact benefit agreements that
are designed to flow benefits from development to the impacted Aboriginal groups,
and socio-economic agreements that are intended to flow benefits and address
impacts for all Northerners.
Academic literature on the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley is divided into
two discernible themes: (1) those who see the primary role of contractual
agreements as addressing deficiencies in the Northern regulatory system, and (2)
those who see the primary role of contractual agreements as increasing public
participation in northern decision-making. Both these schools characterize the
contractual agreements as augmenting or detracting from the existing regulatory
system.
Members of the first school, Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford conclude that
8

S.C. 1998, c.25.
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contractual agreements in the Mackenzie Valley deliberately fill the gap and address
the failings in the design and practice of the environmental assessment regime.
These agreements create legally binding enforcement mechanisms for outstanding
issues that otherwise lack a regulatory home. The agreements address mistrust by
promoting cooperation and committing parties to establishing business
relationships; they address capacity issues by ensuring that the government does
not bear the entire financial burden of the increased demand on social and
environmental services; and they address benefit related issues and support
economic development.9 Affolder likewise argues that the value of environmental
agreements is to allow parties to address deficiencies in the system in
circumstances where there is no political will to address through other avenues.10
Several authors express concern that contractual agreements can undermine the
environmental assessment process. Fidler and Hitch argue that the environmental
assessment process is more transparent and better equipped to address both public
interest issues and the interests of Aboriginal groups than private contractual
agreements.11 Klein, Donihee and Stewart highlight the tension and possible overlap
between the role of public government in addressing socio-economic matters
through public processes and private negotiated agreements that also address the
socio-economic impacts for the Aboriginal population. They conclude that the two
processes (impact benefit agreements and economic impact assessment) can be
complimentary provided that the regulator is able to develop a solid socio-economic
impact assessment practice that could inform IBA negotiations.12
The second group of theorists focus on the role of contractual agreements in
Lindsay Galbraith, Ben Bradshaw and Murray B Rutherford, “Towards a New Supra-Regulatory
Approach to Environmental Assessment in Northern Canada” (March 2007) 25(1) Impact Assessment and
Project Appraisal 27
10 Natasha Affolder “Rethinking Environmental Contracting” (2013) 21 JELP 156 (WL).
11 Courtney Fidler and Michael Hitch, “Impact Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for
Environmental and Aboriginal Justice “ (2007) 35(2) Environmental Journal 49 (QL).
12 Heidi Klein, John Donihee and Gordon Stewart, “Environmental Impact Assessment and Impact
Benefit Agreements: Creative Tension or Conflict ? (2005) available online at
www.impactandbenefit.com/Research.
9
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increasing public participation in Northern decision-making. Lucas focuses on
“bridging practices” which are processes that move participants further along the
spectrum from procedural rights of participation to actual participation in the
decision-making process. There is a key difference between administrative rights,
which allow for participation within a defined system that may not be amenable to
the types of actual outcomes being sought by the Aboriginal groups and the ability
to determine actual outcomes. He argues that the co-management regime in the
Mackenzie Valley is an example of a bridging practice that enhances local
participation and accountability in the operation of the resource management
process, but still does not give Aboriginal groups the right to determine the
substantive outcome. The right to determine substantive outcomes may not be
appropriate in all circumstances but it is more desirable in circumstances where
Aboriginal groups are rightsholders and the key impacts will be felt on their
traditional territory. Lucas argues that impact benefit agreements are one of the
few instruments that secure substantive decision-making rights for Aboriginal
people. In that way, they augment the existing system and create greater
participatory rights.13
Graben similarly notes the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board
consciously promotes increased collaboration between Aboriginal groups and
industry and encourages the use of private agreements to give communities a
greater participation in the licensing process.14 Both Graben and Lucas express
concern regarding the limitations of addressing social needs through private
contract where resorting to private contractual agreements could undermine the
public process.
This academic work provides useful insights into the regulatory system but is
13

Alastair R. Lucas, “Canadian Participatory Rights in Mining and Energy Development: The Bridges
to Empowerment” in Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, eds, Human Rights
in Resource Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 305.
14 Sari M. Graben, “Assessing Stakeholder Participation in Sub-Arctic Co-Management:
Administrative Rule Making and Private Agreements” (2011) 29 Windsor YB Access Just. 195 (QL).
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limited by the tendency to view the contractual arrangements as “add-ons” to the
MVRMA legislative regime with the capacity to either augment or undermine those
environmental goals. This thesis demonstrates that that the regulatory regime in the
Mackenzie Valley operates as a complex system. Various parts of the regulatory
system interact with each other in ways that are sometimes complimentary and at
other times conflicting. The regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley is more
adaptive and promotes greater resilience because of the complex interaction
between the legislative scheme established under the Mackenzie Valley Resource
Management Act, contractual agreements and Aboriginal Law.
This thesis is ultimately concerned with how to most effectively regulate
development in the Mackenzie Valley given the challenges of climate change. A
central argument made in this thesis is that the adaptive capacity of the regime
would be strengthened if the multiplicity of
stakeholders/rightsholders/regulators15 in the Mackenzie Valley were guided by
better articulated environmental goals and an environmental vision.
Central to this thesis is a lengthy review of several key theories of regulatory
governance. These theories of regulatory governance are instrumental in
understanding how the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley functions to
promote adaptive management, with the insights provided by responsible
regulation theory, new governance theory, and resilience theory being particularly
helpful. This paper is heavily influenced by the resilience theorists and their focus
In this paper, I have used rightsholders to refer to Aboriginal groups who have Aboriginal and
Treaty rights that are protected under Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution and stakeholders to
refer to other interested parties, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, whose interests would not be
constitutionally protected. The extent to which Aboriginal groups should be dealt with as
rightsholders as opposed to stakeholders is the subject of debate both domestically and
internationally. See Sara L. Seck, “Indigenous Rights, Environmental Rights, or Stakeholder
Engagement? Comparing IFC and OECD Approaches to Implementation of the Business
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights” (2016) 12:1 McGill Journal of International Sustainable
Development and Practice , forthcoming. Professor Seck makes a convincing argument for a broad
definition of Aboriginal rights. This is advocated because of the vulnerability of Aboriginal peoples to
development, and the gap created because the Canadian constitution does not recognize
environmental rights as a separate and protected category of rights.
15

7
on the promotion of flexibility, adaptability and the fostering of resilience in a nonstationary environment.
This paper is divided into four Parts. Part one is a review of the theories of
regulatory governance that may provide useful guidance on how to build a more
adaptive and resilient regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley.
Part two discusses the importance of the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management
Act (MVRMA) as the primary statute addressing the regulation of land and water in
the Mackenzie Valley as well as the interaction of the MVRMA with Aboriginal law.
This involves a review of both primary sources and academic sources.
Part Three examines the three types of contractual agreements most often utilized
for resource development projects in the north. These are (1) impact benefit
agreements, (2) socio-economic agreements, and (3) environmental agreements. I
rely extensively on a review of the literature in discussing the environmental
agreements associated with the Ekati, Diavik, and Snap Lake diamond mines. The
discussion of environmental agreements associated with the Gahcho Kue Mine and
Giant Mine Remediation Project is based on primary sources including the
documents filed with the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board.
The section on impact benefit agreements and socio-economic agreements is based
predominantly on a literature review because impact benefit agreements are
confidential agreements and largely unavailable.
Part Four analyzes how the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley operates as a
complex system, and identifies some of the characteristics of the regulatory regime
which allows the components to work together to promote a more adaptive and
resilient system.
This thesis highlights the reasons why the environmental regime in the Mackenzie
Valley has the potential to provide a more adaptive and resilient model for
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environmental regulation. These include: (1) the Mackenzie Valley Resource
Management Act is an integrated resource management scheme and is less likely to
compartmentalize environmental and social effects; (2) a focus on co-management
allows it to incorporate different perspectives and world views, especially
Aboriginal perspectives16; (3) links to Aboriginal law and the modern land claims
process makes the scheme less susceptible to political pressure and to the legal
pressure to conform to administrative law principles which are often incompatible
with adaptive management; and (4) contract law is used to augment the regulatory
system in ways that often (although not always) builds in more flexibility and
provides for additional input by Aboriginal peoples.
The key piece missing for effective environmental management in the Mackenzie
Valley is principled flexibility. Principled flexibility allows for stronger, legally
enforceable and institutionally supported goals with more flexibility on how to
achieve these goals.17 Environmental and Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley
do not share a sufficiently strong environmental and social purpose that is capable
of sustaining an adaptive environmental governance system across a multiplicity of
regulatory instruments. Without this underlying coordinating framework, the
northern regulatory regime may become a jumble of legal and policy instruments
with an unfortunate tendency towards over-bureaucratization. However, I am
convinced that the regulatory regime in the north has the ability to transform
environmental regulation when this final piece of principled flexibility is enabled.

16

Co-management is defined as the sharing of management power and responsibility between the
government and local resource users. See F. Berkes, P. George and R. Preston, “Co-Management” (1991)
18(2) Alternatives 12 at 12. In the Mackenzie Valley, this involves power sharing with the Aboriginal
people who are the primary resource users on their traditional territories.
17
Robin Kundis Craig and Melinda Harm Benson. “Symposium: The Next Generation of
Environmental and Resources Law: What has changed in Forty Years and What Needs to Change as a
Result: Replacing Sustainability” (2013) 46 Akron LR 841 at 877.
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CHAPTER TWO
2

Regulatory Theory

Regulatory theory and its role in resource development has been a topic of much
academic discussion particularly since the late 1960s and 1970s, which saw both a
growing awareness of environmental issues, and the rise and increasing complexity
of the administrative state. Some of the major schools of thought providing insight
into modes of environmental governance are outlined below. Ultimately, these
schools of thought are not mutually exclusive and a successful regulatory system
should draw insights from all. This paper pays particular attention to the resilience
theory, which argues that adaptive management must be an integral part of any
attempt to regulate complex environmental problems and is particularly compelling
given the undeniable reality of climate change and the unpredictability of the
current arctic environment.

2.1

Command and Control Regulation

Command and Control regulation starts from the premise that governments have
the ability to command through law, and that they are then authorized to control the
behavior of others through enforcement of those commands. Agencies are
responsible for establishing prescriptive environmental standards, monitoring
compliance with those standards and enforcing punitive sanctions for their
violation.
Command and Control is a vital element of any regulatory system particularly in
circumstances where it is important for government to establish and enforce
environmental bottom lines or where you have insufficient corporate compliance.
Historically, command and control regulation has been very successful in addressing
pressing environmental issues that were amenable to this type of “big stick”
approach. For example, this type of regulatory approach has been quite successful in
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dealing with air and water pollution in situations where it has targeted point-source
pollution and waste disposal practices.18
Command and Control is a centralized system of regulation, and has been criticized
for its “one size fits all” approach. Critics of command and control regulation argue
that it is not suitable for managing large scale and complex environmental problems
such as climate change. These types of complex problems require holistic,
integrated, and at the same time localized eco-system approaches. This can be
difficult to reconcile with command and control mechanisms that are centralized
and designed to address a particular problem, without addressing the complex
interactions that occur within eco-systems. Complex problems are not amenable to
top-down solutions imposed by governments and usually require solutions that are
more decentralized and sensitive to local and changing conditions.19
Another key criticism of command and control regulation is its adversarial in
nature. It has as a primary focus the imposition of penalties for non-compliance.
This can provoke unproductive resistance from individuals and businesses rather
than fostering a more collaborative approach to environmental management. The
result is a system that is inefficient to operate and overly bureaucratic.20

2.2

Deregulation

Deregulation theorists argue that current environmental regulation is excessive and
hinders economic development. They argue that market forces can achieve
desirable environmental outcomes as long as the market is properly constituted and
the appropriate economic incentives are in place.

J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management – Is it Possible? (2005)7 Minn J.L. Sci. & Tech. 21
(2005).
19
Cameron Holley, Neil Gunningham and Clifford Shearing. The New Environmental Governance (New
York: Earthscan, 2012) at 2.
20
Ibid at 2.
18
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Rosenbloom contends that environmental degradation occurs because the
environment is not appropriately valued in the market place. There is an economic
disconnect because the environment is seen as a “common pool” resource that is
available for depletion without the costs of that depletion being given appropriate
economic weight.21 Once environmental degradation is factored in as a cost of
production, then market forces will correct this harm without the need for excessive
regulation. Attempts to factor in environmental costs include pollution taxes such as
“Cap and Trade” schemes that limit the amount of pollution that the state will
authorize and makes the right to pollute an economically valuable and tradable
commodity.
There are environmental costs to development and, if they are not acknowledged
and factored in appropriately, those costs are often absorbed by the most vulnerable
people in society. However, deregulation is often advanced in order to promote
economic development through “smaller government”. This paper demonstrates
that the presence of a strong regulator (although not necessarily more rules) is key
to a strong environmental management regime in the Mackenzie Valley.

2.3

Responsive Regulation

This is a variation of the command and control model that allows and encourages
corporate responsibility within a narrowly defined and heavily scrutinized
environment. It has been an influential theory of environmental regulation since
1992 when Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite published their seminal work entitled
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the De-regulation Debate.22

Jonathan Rosenbloom. “Defining Nature as a Common Pool Resource” in Ken Hirokawa ed,
Environmental Law and Contrasting Ideas of Nature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 4763.
22
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
21
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Braithwaite and Ayres propose a regulatory pyramid model. At the base of the
pyramid is the more restorative, dialogue-based approach to ensuring compliance.
As regulated parties move up the sanctions pyramid, increasingly more demanding
interventions are involved. All parties understand that the ultimate sanctions
available to the regulator are formidable. However, these sanctions are only used as
a last resort if other approaches aimed at increasing the internal capacity of the
regulated actors to resolve the issue are either unsuccessful or not feasible.23
Affolder describes responsive regulation as an ongoing process of moves and
counter-moves fine tuned to the individual actors involved and their conduct. 24
Braithwaite and Ayers argue that regulated actors see this type of regulatory model
as more legitimate and procedurally fair and therefore compliance with the law is
more likely. They contend that this system is more strategic and therefore less
susceptible to system capacity overload.25
Barton holds that responsible regulation is transformative as it creates space for
more than just the regulator and the regulated. The role of the concerned public can
move from a peripheral role seeking to interpose itself in the relationship between
government and the regulated agency into a more central part of the regulatory
scheme.26
Braithwaite’s more recent work places increased emphasis on the importance of
networking in the regulatory process. Braithwaite recognizes that public actors can
play a significant role in placing pressure on the non-compliant. He identifies banks
as powerful networking partners who are able to exert significant control over the

Ibid. at 42.
Natasha Affolder, “Why Study Large Projects? Environmental Regulation’s Neglected Frontier” (2011)
44 UBC L Rev. 521-55 at paragraph 2-3.
25
Ayres and Braithwaite, Supra, note 22.
26
Barry Barton, “Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resource
Development” in Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, eds. Human Rights in
Resource Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 77 at 110.
23
24
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regulated.27 The current focus on social license, or the securing of community
support as a prerequisite to development would also fall into this networking
category. Affolder argues that this focus on networking may be overstated because
of the divergent interests of networking partners, many of whom are single interest
focused and may work at cross purposes with the regulator. 28 For example, banks
are primarily concerned with protecting their financial investment. They want
finality in decision-making, which can work at cross-purposes with adaptive
management.
This thesis demonstrates that the presence of a strong regulator in the Mackenzie
Valley resource management boards, and the threat that the Boards will impose
mitigations on proponents in the event that they fail to reach agreements with
stakeholders/rightsholders is key to the effectiveness of the Mackenzie Valley
regulatory regime.

2.4

Dynamic Federalism

Dynamic federalism is a reaction against the prevailing American economic theory
that there is an optimal level of government involvement to regulate any problem
such that efficient regulation can only occur when the regulating entity fully
internalize the costs and benefits of its policies. This has often been referred to as
the “matching principle” and holds that regulatory authority should reside at the
level of government that roughly matches the geographic scope of the problem so
that national environmental issues are dealt with at the federal level and regional
environmental issues are dealt with at the state or local level.29

John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44 UBC LR 475 (QL) at 51 and 52.
Natasha Affolder, “Why Study Large Projects? Environmental Regulation’s Neglected Frontier” (2011)
44 UBC L Rev. 521-55 at 521.
29
David E Adelman and Kirsten H. Engel “Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority” (2008) Minnesota Law Review 1796 at 1798.
27
28
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Dynamic federalism explicitly calls for the overlapping of federal, state and local
authority such that any matter may presumptively be within the authority of two or
more of federal and state and local governments. For example, federal governments
may regulate local issues such as remediation of contaminated sites, and state and
local governments may exercise their powers to develop policies on environmental
issues of national and even international importance such as climate change.
Furthermore, these authorities are not static but adaptive to the regulatory needs so
that the level of government dealing with an environmental problem may flip
between federal and state powers depending on the circumstances.30
The flexible distribution of authority allows government to react more quickly and
with less political jockeying, and promotes increased cooperation and synergy
between agencies. 31 Overlapping jurisdiction could also lead to inefficiencies and a
lack of transparency as to ultimate authority and accountability.
Dynamic federalism is an American theory but it is included in this paper because it
provides possible insights in dealing with Aboriginal governments as a Third or
Fourth Level of government (federal, provincial, local and Aboriginal) within an
ever-changing and more complex Canadian federalist system.

2.5

New Governance Theory

New Governance Theory provides a more participatory and collaborative model in
which government, industry and other societal actors share responsibility for
achieving policy objectives. Orly Lobel, in her seminal work on this topic, argues that
the new governance model is intended to be an alternative to both state-based top
down regulation and complete reliance on market-based norms by inventing
30

Ibid. at 1796
JB Ruhl and John Salzman, “Climate Change, Dead Zones and Massive Problems in the Administrative
State: A Guide to Whittling Away” (2010) 98 Calif. L. Rev. 59 at 103-107.
31
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flexible and responsive administrative practices that are more suited to the modern
reality than either large bureaucracies or private market mechanisms.32
Lobel identifies the following attributes as the organizing principles of the new
governance model: (1) increased participation of non-state actors; (2) stakeholder
collaboration; (3) diversity and competition; (4) decentralization and subsidiarity;
(5) integration of policy domains; (6) flexibility and non-coerciveness; (7)
adaptability and dynamic learning; and (8) legal orchestration among proliferated
norm generating entities. With regards to the final principle, she argues that this is
achieved through the interpenetration of policy boundaries, new public/private
partnerships and next-generation policy strategies which are more inclusive such as
negotiated rule-making, decentralized and dynamic problem solving, disclosure
regimes and coordinated information collection. 33
Ruggie argues that corporate conduct is shaped by three distinct governance
systems: (1) the system of public law and governance (domestic and international);
(2) civil governance systems involving stakeholders/rightsholders affected by
business enterprises and employing various social compliance mechanisms; and (3)
corporate governance. He argues that often the public law system is not the
dominant governance system at play and that stakeholder driven processes and
internal corporate structures may be more effective in furthering policy goals.34 This
suggests the need for a more collaborative regulatory model with increased
interaction and greater synergies among various governance systems.
New Governance values the process of dialogue and collective decision-making.
Graben develops the concept of ‘deliberative democracy’. Deliberative democracy is
a process-oriented goal involving the generation of collective decisions via reasoned
32

Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought (November 2004) 89:262 at 268.
33
Ibid. at 265-268.
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Human Rights” (2014) 20 Global Governance 5 at 9.
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debate among all concerned stakeholders. 35 Holley, Gunningham and Shearing
characterize new environmental governance as the collaboration between various
stakeholders working together in furtherance of commonly agreed upon or
mutually negotiated goals.36 The way that consensus is reached is as important as
the outcome, although not every circumstance lends itself to this type of diffuse
decision-making.
Ruhl identifies new governance theory as one of several adaptive management
theories that is potentially transformative. He argues that new governance
principles allow for more diverse responses to a problem by broadening the number
of instruments involved in environmental governance, thus creating resilience.37
Ruhl and Salzman caution that the focus on experimentation, collaboration and
diversity encouraged by new governance theorists, may also increase uncertainty
and blur lines of agency accountability. They state poetically that the potential for
backfire increases with the number of agencies and diversity of instruments thrown
at a problem potentially leading to “a glorious mess.” 38
This paper examines the importance of contractual agreements in expanding the
northern regulatory regime and achieving environmental objectives. The response
to climate change in the north needs to be coordinated, mutually reinforcing and
oriented towards collective environmental goals. It will not be effective if it is simply
a series of well-intentioned programs. New governance theory highlights the
importance of engaging stakeholders/rights holders in dialogue and in the process
of constructing a common vision that can span across these different regulatory
instruments.
Sari M. Graben, “Assessing Stakeholder Participation in Sub-Arctic Co-Management: Administrative
Rulemaking ad Private Agreements” (2011) 29 Windsor YB Access Just 195 (QL) at 4.
36
Holley, Gunningham and Shearing, Supra note 19 at 4.
37
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Carolina LR 1373 (QL) at 1401.
38
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2.6

Resilience Theory

Resilience theorists argue that the current regulatory system can never adequately
address the complexities of the natural and the social environment (and the
complex interactions between the two). These theorists argue for an adaptive
management approach to environmental regulation that has as its primary goal the
promotion of flexibility, adaptability and the fostering of resilience. Resilience is the
capacity of the system to absorb change and continue functioning. This is an
emerging theory of environmental governance and therefore less established than
the previously outlined theories. I outline below what I consider to be the key tenets
of resilience theory.

2.6.1 The environment is a complex system and must be regulated as a complex system
The primary insight of resilience theory is that ecosystems are much more complex
and interactive than previously acknowledged and that regulatory law is ill-suited to
that fundamental reality.
Kundis Craig draws a fundamental distinction between 'complicated systems and
complex systems. Complicated systems are notable because the elements of that
system maintain an element of independence from each other and the system can be
managed by its individual components. She argues that most environmental
problems are not amenable to this kind of compartmentalization precisely because
they arise in complex ecosystems and previous attempts to break environmental
problems into sub-components have largely been unsuccessful. Complex systems
are more dynamic, exhibit complex collective behavior, and respond more readily to
their internal and external environments. These dynamic capabilities give
ecosystems a certain degree of flexibility to cope with changes in this system.39 That

39

Robin Kundis Craig, The Current State of Environmental Law: Part 1: Essay: Learning to Think about
Complex Environmental Systems in Environmental and Natural Resources Law and Legal Scholarship: A
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resilience is part of what needs to be fostered and protected in environmental
regulation.

2.6.2 Ecosystems exhibit a high degree of resilience, but are still evolving and capable of
radical change
Holling, Gunderson and Ludwig argue that ecosystems are robust when they have
functional diversity and special heterogeneity in the species and physical variables
and landscapes. The stability domains that define the ecosystem are so large that
external disturbances have to be extreme and/or persistent before the system
transforms irreversibly into another system. Nonetheless nature is evolving and it is
important to acknowledge and plan for the unpredictable dynamics in ecosystems,
including the potential for radical change.40
Holling, Gunderson and Ludwig highlight that human society is also resilient in its
interaction with the environment. Peoples’ adaptive capabilities have made it
possible not only to persist passively, but also to create and innovate when limits
are reached. This includes the ability to develop successful remedial policies
incrementally once the need becomes apparent. They argue that a primary goal of
environmental governance is to develop resilience in both the natural and human
systems.41 This involves fostering diversity and adaptability in both the natural and
human systems so that these systems are better able to absorb change while still
maintaining their fundamental characteristics.
Kundis Craig and Harm Benson argue that environmental regulation must also
acknowledge and plan for the possibility of radical regime change resulting from
climate change.42 This challenges some fundamental assumptions about
environmental law, including sustainability.
C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson and Donald Ludwig, “In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change” in
Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling eds. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and
Natural Systems, (Washington: Island Press 2002) at 15.-18
41
Ibid at 18.
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40

19

2.6.3 Some resilience theorists challenge sustainability as a key organizing concept for
environmental governance
A key focus of environmental regulation in recent years has been on sustainable
development. Sustainable development is most often defined as “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet its own needs.” This definition is taken from the Bruntland
Report, and has two key organizing concepts: (1) the limits on development
imposed by the environment and (2) the priority should be given to the needs of the
world’s poorest populations and to inter-generational equity.43
Dernback correctly notes that sustainability is one of the most important ideas to
have emerged from the twentieth century. He argues that sustainability-thinking
involves a shift away from thinking about environmental costs to treating the
environment as a source of environmental benefits and opportunities. The
environment and society are interlinked such that continuing environmental
degradation cannot promote human well-being.44 This requires structuring our
economic and social development so that it does not further degrade the
environment but rather, seeks to protect and restore the environment.
Kundis Craig and Harm Benson argue that sustainability is no longer a realistic
environmental management strategy. They contend that sustainability is founded on
an incorrect premise that the environment can be managed through a balancing of
environmental and development factors. With proper resource management, there
is always a way to return to an optimal state of the nature. This is based on a belief
that nature is static and that baseline environmental conditions will remain more or
less the same over long periods of time with minimal ecological complexity. Kundis
G.H. Bruntland and World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future:
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987).
44 John C. Dernbach “Sustainable Development” (2012) Widener Law School Legal Studies Research
Paper Series N0. 13-24 available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256672.
43
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Craig and Harm Benson argue that climate change is a “game-changer” such that
baseline conditions are no longer reliable indicators of future behavior and ecosystems may be transforming into new and irreversible states of being. This “nonstationarity” requires the displacement of sustainability goals with environmental
goals aimed at encouraging resilience.45
Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas are resilience theorists that continue to advocate
sustainability as a fundamental environmental policy goal. They note that fostering
resilience is a key component of sustainability so that the two concepts can be
mutually reinforcing.46
Denbrack and Cheever argue that sustainability and resilience are mutually
reinforcing terms. Sustainability is a decision-making framework as well as an
environmental goal. Within this decision-making framework, environmental
protection must be integrated into decisions about social and economic
development, and social justice and economic viability must be integrated into
decisions about environmental quality. Resilience is an important consideration for
sustainability. However, resilience does not have the same normative basis as
sustainability. Decision makers should not ignore human well-being, persistent
global poverty and social equity. Denbrack and Cheever argue that sustainability
remains an important equitable concept that needs to be reinforced not undermined
by resilience theory.47
Bosselmann identifies three factors that continue to make sustainable development
politically relevant: (1) it provides an alternative narrative to the growth paradigm

Kundis Craig and Harm Benson, Supra note 17 at 856-862
Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R. Allen and Heriberto Cabezas in “Resilience and Environmental Law
Reform Symposium: Panarchy, Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building
Resilience (2009) 87 Neb. L. Rev. 1036
47 John C. Dernback and Federico Cheever, “Sustainable Development and its Discontents” (2015) 4:2
Transnational Environmental Law 247 available online at
http://journals.cambridge.org.abstract_S2047102515000163 at 279-287.
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which people in power cannot ignore; (2) the broad, ambiguous meaning of
sustainable development makes it appealing to a wide group of interests who are
able to draw on sustainable development for moral legitimacy; and (3) it links
ecological, economic, and social issues and therefore encourages dialogue and
concrete steps towards achieving sustainable development among diverse groups
including industry, governments, and environmental non-government
organizations.48 Bosselmann correctly identifies the political importance of the
sustainable development movement in translating theory into concrete action. The
broad process of dialogue and diverse decision-making also fosters a more flexible
and adaptable approach to environmental management that reinforces resilience
thinking.

2.6.4 Current environmental decision-making is not well suited to address complex
ecological issues
Many resilience theorists are concerned that there is a fundamental disconnect
between the regulatory problem that needs to be addressed and the regulatory tools
employed by the regulator. Ruhl and Salzman argue that current environmental
regulation erroneously regards environmental effects as homogeneous, linear and
proportionally aggregated. This leads to a system that is heavily reliant on costbenefit analysis, risk assessment and pre-decision assessment.49 Kundis Craig and
Ruhl note that heavy reliance on these types of front-end analytical tools is
misguided in a system characterized by constant change. The current system makes
the erroneous assumption that there is a robust capacity to predict and assess
market and non-market impacts of a proposed development when in fact that kind
of up-front analysis is not feasible in a complex environmental system.50 A robust
Klaus Bosselmann, “The Concept of Sustainable Development” in Klaus Bosselmann, David
Grinlinton and Prue Taylor eds. Environmental Law for a Sustainable Society 2nd ed. (New Zealand
Centre for Environmental Law Monograph Series: Volume 1, 2013) at 96.
49
Ruhl and Salzman, Supra note 31 at 66.
50
Robin Kundis Craig and JB Ruhl “ Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management” (2014) 67
Vand. L. Rev. 1 at 6-7.
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regulatory system needs the capacity to constantly assess and re-assess and to
adapt accordingly.
In their scientific research, Holling and Meffe noted that management strategies
often fail to account for the complexity of ecosystems. As a result of misguided
management efforts, systems can gradually lose resilience and become less able to
absorb disturbances.51 Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas are particularly critical of
“single trait-maximization laws” that address complex ecological issues from a
single standpoint. They argue that U.S. Endangered Species Act, 1973 failed as a
regulatory strategy because it did not adequately take account for the complex
interactions of endangered species within the eco-system. By focusing only on the
species at risk, it actually created a system which was more vulnerable to
development.52

2.6.5 The modern regulatory system must incorporate adaptive management
Resilience theorists argue that adaptive management is key to effective
environmental regulation of resources and the environment. Adaptive management
recognizes the need to react to ongoing changes in the environment rather than
assume a linear and static environmental response.
Arnold and Gunderson contend that adaptive regulation must recognize the
complex relationship between ecosystems and social systems and aim to design
structures, methods and processes that enhance the adaptive capacity of both the
environmental and the social systems. They identify the key features of a more
adaptive legal system as: (1) multiplicity of articulated goals; (2) polycentric,
multimodal and integrationist structure; (3) adaptive measures based on flexibility,
C.S. Holling and Gary K. Meffe, “Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural Resource
Management (1996)10 Conservation Biology 328 at 332 as quoted by Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R.
Allen and Heriberto Cabezas in “Resilience and Environmental Law Reform Symposium: Panarchy,
Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience (2009) 87 Neb. L. Rev.
1036 at 1039.
52 Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas, Supra Note 46 at 1039-1040.
51
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discretion, and regard for context; and (4) iterative legal-pluralist processes with
feedback loops and accountability. 53
Of particular interest is Arnold and Gunderson’s focus on polycentrism and
multimodality. Polycentrism refers to a structure in which there are multiple
centers or sources of authority. Multimodality refers to the use of multiple methods
for achieving a policy goal in a way that aims to connect and integrate the various
methods. Arnold and Gunderson write that both are features of adaptive law that
make it possible to deal with complex environmental and social problems without
breaking them down into sub-components and missing the larger picture.54
Ruhl distinguishes between engineering resilience and ecological resilience in the
design of regulatory instruments. Engineering resilience focuses on the return to the
equilibrium state, and relies on the tools of reliability, efficiency, and quality control.
Ecological resilience, in contrast, is measured by the amount of change that a system
can absorb before it changes from one structural state to another. Ecological
resilience relies on the tools of scalability (allowing the system to shift relevant
temporal and spatial scales to adjust for changing conditions), modularity (allowing
the system to shift functions and relationships within the system to adjust to
changing conditions) and evolvability (fostering the capacity for the system to
manage these shifts for extended periods of time).55
Ruhl argues that a regulatory system must develop the adaptive capacity to move
between resilience strategies (engineering and ecological resilience) as conditions
change and there are shifts in variability and predictability. He argues that the
current regime is currently designed for engineering resilience as reflected in the
focus on pre-decision environmental assessment, cost-benefit analysis, records of
decision and judicial review litigation. This is premised on a relatively static view of
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold and Lance H. Gunderson, “Adaptive Law” forthcoming in Craig R. Allen
and Ahjond S. Garmestani, eds, “Resilience and Law” (Columbia University Press, 2013) at 5.
54
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nature. However, environmental variables such as climate change can lead to a
situation where variability of change is high and predictability is low so that
ecological resilience strategies offer an important enhancement of flexibility and
should be the default for design purposes. 56
For example, the MVRMA is appropriately predicated on robust environmental
assessment (engineering resilience). However, the environment is constantly
changing and the challenge for northern regulators is to build into the system
appropriate monitoring and follow-up in order to address unexpected
environmental and social changes (ecological resilience). The regulatory system
needs to be sufficiently flexible that it can allow for changes in mitigations in real
time without the need for time consuming administrative law remedies.

2.6.6 Stakeholder engagement is an important element in managing for resilience

Resilience theorists stress the importance of stakeholder engagement in increasing
flexibility and adaptability of the system. Stakeholder engagement can also be a
critical element in establishing the political viability of a project.
Kundis Craig and Ruhl maintain that adaptive management theory has evolved into
two main branches. The Decision-Theoretic model emphasizes working with
relevant policy stakeholders to define the management problem but then relies on
agency experts to develop the process models to guide decision-making. The
Resilience-Experimentalist model emphasizes maintaining a shared understanding
among the relevant policy stakeholders through a continuous process of learning,
hypothesis testing and experimentation within the management-problem context.
There is much greater emphasis on continued stakeholder involvement and multi-

Ibid.at 5-7. Ruhl is specifically referring to the American environmental regime but the MVRMA has
a similar focus on engineering resilience.
56

25
party collaborative planning in the latter.57 In my experience, the Decision-Theoretic
School is most often employed by government but shared regulation among a
multiplicity of stakeholders/shareholders as is advocated in this paper, requires a
shift to the Resilience-Experimentalist model.
Garmestani, Allen and Cabezas highlight the importance of “bridging organizations”
in catalyzing the formation of policies that are flexible and reflective of resilience
management. Examples of “bridging organizations” include (1) assessment teams,
which are made up of actors across sectors in a socio-ecological system; (2) nongovernmental organizations, which create an arena for trust-building, learning,
conflict resolution and adaptive co-management; and (3) the scientific community
which acts as a watchdog and facilitator for adaptive management.58
Bridging organizations perform a fundamental role in adaptive management
because that they are able to monitor the status of the socio-ecological system and
can be a catalyst for rapid change if conditions are deteriorating. They also serve an
important role in facilitating cross-scale linkages, improving communications and
creating opportunities for collaboration within the system.59

2.6.7 Law is also a complex adaptive system and is maladapted to resilience thinking
Adaptive management poses some formidable challenges for the legal system. It
necessarily gives more discretion to decision-makers, which raises concerns
regarding accountability. The lack of finality in decision-making is unnerving to
investors and can potentially discourage investment. In addition, there is the
potential for a lack of transparency given the multiplicity of regulatory actors and
regulatory decisions.
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Kundis Craig and Ruhl contend that administrative law is resistant to this type of
multi-stage adaptive decision-making. Kundis Craig and Ruhl identify concerns over
(1) agency discretion, (2) lack of finality, (3) the potential for endless judicial review
of numerous agency decisions, and (4) difficulty managing expectations of public
input at all stages of “dial-turning”. These obstacles need to be addressed if
administrative law is to meaningfully co-exist with adaptive management.60
Arnold and Gunderson argue that an adaptive legal system would need to provide
the right combination of adaptive flexibility and principled accountability of the
decision-makers. They contend that discretionary decision-making is a necessary
element of adaptive environmental management and that concerns regarding the
arbitrary nature of discretion can be addressed through the development of
appropriate and relevant standards to govern the exercise of discretion and to
which decision-makers can be held accountable.61
Kundis Craig and Harm Benson argue that this can be achieved through ‘principled
flexibility’. This involves a focus on stronger, legally enforceable and institutionally
supported goals but more flexibility on how these goals might be achieved and an
increased ability to adapt to changing conditions.62
Ruhl argues that law in itself is a complex adaptive system. This leads to the
challenge of one complex adaptive system attempting to regulate another complex
adaptive system. Ruhl believes that our legal regime is fundamentally incompatible
with adaptive management strategies. Successfully working with the dynamic forces
of complex adaptive natural and social systems demands an active and adaptive
management regime that eschews optimization approaches seeking stability. Yet
one of the goals of law is to establish and maintain relatively stable contexts within
which other social systems (banking, health care, education) can operate over time.
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This concept is integral to the way that law has developed and continues to develop.
It remains to be seen whether such disparate and conflicting goals can ever be
reconciled.63
Stacey also argues that law is ill suited to environmental protection because the
amount of executive discretion required to address complex environmental
problems is incompatible with the rules of administrative decision-making. She
argues that this incompatibility can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms
and by treating environmental protection as an ongoing emergency. 64
This paper will incorporate insights from all of the above theories but particularly
from the schools of responsive regulation, new governance and resilience because of
their particular focus on increasing adaptability and flexibility in environmental
regulation and their focus on incorporating multiple stakeholders and rights holders
into the overall management regime. These are key characteristics required for
effective environmental management in the north.
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CHAPTER 3
3

The Regulatory Regime Established in the Mackenzie
Valley Region of the Northwest Territories

This Chapter provides an overview of the environmental regulatory regime in the
Mackenzie Valley as well as the interaction of that regime with Aboriginal law and
particularly Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution.65

3.1 A brief overview of Environmental Law in Canada and in the
Northwest Territories
Canada is a federal state with division of powers between the federal and provincial
governments. The heads of powers for each government are set out in Sections 91
and 92 of the Canadian Constitution.66 The environment is not specifically identified
as a head of power in the Canadian Constitution and as a result, neither the federal
or provincial governments have exclusive jurisdiction over the environment.
Instead, environmental jurisdiction is shared by the provincial and federal
governments under other heads of powers including property and civil rights,
criminal law, fisheries and oceans, shipping and natural resources. The federal
government has constitutional responsibility for aboriginal issues, which is also a
major influence on resource development and environmental issues in the north.
The Northwest Territories is not a province and does not have the constitutional
powers set out in Section 92. However, the federal government has delegated
powers normally exercised by the provinces to the government of the Northwest
Territories though a number of Federal Acts, most notably the Northwest Territories
Act. 67 The Northwest Territories Act is not constitutionally protected and could be
revoked by another Act of the federal parliament. Still, the Northwest Territories is
evolving as an independent entity from the federal government and the Courts have
65
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recognized that the NWT has a special province-like status.68 Since 1967, the NWT
has been delegated responsibility for health care, education, social services,
highways, airport administration and forestry management.
In April 2014, the federal government devolved the management of public land,
water and resources from the Government of Canada to the Government of the
Northwest Territories (GNWT). 69 The GNWT will now have decision-making
authority about the use of public land, water and resources in the NWT. As well, the
GNWT will be entitled to 50% of the resource revenue from development on public
land in the NWT.70 This is a historic change that will greatly increase regional
control over resource development in the north.
The key piece of environmental legislation in the Mackenzie Valley region of the
NWT is the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (MVRMA)71, which is an
integrated resource management act dealing with the regulation of land and water
in the NWT as well as environmental assessment. The MVRMA is still federal
legislation, but a number of responsibilities and decision-making authorities held by
the federal Minister under the MVRMA, including the authority of approve Type A
water licenses, the designation of inspectors, the holding of security and powers,
and many of the duties and functions related to environmental assessment were
delegated to the GNWT.72 The GNWT considers this delegated authority to be an
interim step and has negotiated a review of these provisions in the devolution
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agreement in five years.73 The GNWT ultimately would like to make the MVRMA
territorial legislation.
The MVRMA will be scrutinized in the next five years as the GNWT decides the
direction of resource development in the north. This provides a unique opportunity
to re-visit some of the operating principles of the MVRMA, and perhaps address, as
this paper argues, the need for more strategic vision on global environmental issues
and the need to develop a regulatory strategy that prioritizes adaptive management
strategies and acknowledges resilience in eco-systems as an environmental goal.

3.2

A Brief Overview of Aboriginal Law in the Northwest Territories

3.2.1 The MVRMA Co-Management Regime as a Treaty Right
The operation of the MVRMA is profoundly influenced by its interaction with Section
35 of the Canadian Constitution. Section 35 recognizes and affirms the existing
Aboriginal and Treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. The Supreme
Court of Canada has interpreted Section 35 as requiring the federal and territorial
governments to justify the infringement of an aboriginal right in accordance with
the constitutional test set out in the case of R v. Sparrow.74
It is well recognized that resource development projects frequently infringe on
Aboriginal and Treaty rights. Section 35 provides an incentive to the governments to
work through environmental issues with the aboriginal population in order to avoid
conflict and constitutional litigation on the interpretation of Aboriginal and Treaty
rights.
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There is also an argument that the co-management regime established under the
MVRMA is an existing Treaty right that is constitutionally protected under Section
35. The argument is based on the fact that (1) the co-management regime was
established pursuant to the Sahtu, Gwich’in and Tlicho land claim agreements75 and
(2) these land claim agreements are modern treaties.
The matter is currently before the Courts. The Tlicho government has commenced
an action to prevent the federal Government from implementing amendments to the
MVRMA which would eliminate the regional Land and Water Boards. The authority
of the regional boards would be absorbed into a restructured Mackenzie Valley Land
and Water Board that still allows for substantial Aboriginal membership on the new
Board. The Tlicho claim that the Wek’eezhii Land and Water Board is protected by
the co-management provisions in the land claim. The Supreme Court of the
Northwest Territories has granted an injunction finding that there was a significant
constitutional issue to be heard.76 The federal government appealed that injunction
but subsequently announced that the action would not proceed further.77

3.2.2 The Duty to Consult
Section 35 has also been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada to include an
obligation on the Crown to consult with aboriginal people before engaging in
conduct that might adversely affect their Aboriginal rights or title. In some
circumstances, this may include a corresponding duty to accommodate aboriginal
concerns. 78 In the resource management context, this could include imposing terms
and conditions in permits to protect aboriginal rights or interests, or paying
compensation.

This is discussed in more detail in Paragraph 3.3.
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Resource development permits in the Mackenzie Valley frequently impact
Aboriginal rights (particularly Aboriginal rights to harvest wildlife) and trigger the
government’s obligation to consult with affected Aboriginal groups. This has the
potential to be a time-consuming and politically charged process. However, the
Supreme Court of Canada has also indicated that the Federal Government can, in
appropriate circumstances, rely on its statutory processes in order to fulfill the duty
to consult.79
This Federal Court considered the link between the MVRMA and Section 35 in
Ka’a’Gee Tu First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General). 80 The Federal Court found
that the MVRMA process provided a significant opportunity for consultation with
Aboriginal groups on Section 35 issues. However, the process was flawed because
the federal and territorial ministers did not consult with affected Aboriginal groups
prior to modifying a decision of The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact
Review Board (MVEIRB) under Section 130 even though there was no statutory
requirement that they do so. They struck down the decision and required the
ministers to further consult with the Aboriginal group.
The federal and territorial governments rely on the MVRMA board process to meet
the majority of their Section 35 consultation obligations. As a result, the federal and
territorial governments must ensure that the board processes provide significant
opportunities for Aboriginal engagement. This provides an incentive for those
governments to build capacity for the Aboriginal communities to participate in the
hearings and to provide participant funding to ensure that the board processes
allow for meaningful Aboriginal consultation. As well, it creates an incentive for the
federal and territorial governments to encourage developers to enter into
contractual agreements with Aboriginal groups (impact benefit agreements,
environmental agreements). Those contractual agreements often contain
accommodations for impacts to Aboriginal and Treaty rights which the federal and
79
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territorial governments under Section 35 must be satisfied are appropriate as part
of their fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples.

3.2.3 The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (NWT)
Environmental regulation in the Mackenzie Valley region of the Northwest
Territories is governed primarily by the MVRMA. Land use permits and water
licenses are issued pursuant to the MVRMA. Other authorizations are issued
pursuant to both federal and territorial legislation. Fisheries authorizations are
issued pursuant to the federal Fisheries Act81 and timber cutting permits are issued
pursuant to the territorial Forest Management Act.82 The environmental assessment
procedure under the MVRMA is triggered by an application for a permit under either
federal or territorial legislation. Once the recommendations of the environmental
assessment panel are accepted by the federal and territorial government, they
become binding on all federal and territorial officials exercising their authority,
under both federal and territorial legislation.83 In this way, the MVRMA works with
other legislation to form the environmental regulatory system.

3.3

MVRMA - Origin in Comprehensive Land Claims

The MVRMA was enacted in 1998 to implement the federal government’s land claim
obligations. It applies in the Mackenzie Valley region of the Northwest Territories,
which corresponds generally to the ancestral lands of the Dene peoples located
within the boundaries of the Northwest Territories.84 Excluded are those from the
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The Mackenzie Valley is defined in the Gwich’in Comprehensive Land claim as the area within the
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Western Arctic Region of the Northwest Territories, which comprises the ancestral
lands of the Inuvialuit, a distinct Aboriginal group from the Dene. The Inuvialuit
have a different environmental management regime as negotiated in the Inuvialuit
Land Claim Agreement.85
The MVRMA is primarily designed to address integrated resource management. The
MVRMA is intended to address resource development in the fragile arctic ecosystem,
which extends beyond the traditional territory of any one aboriginal group.
Aboriginal property and other distributive issues are addressed in other initiatives
such as land claim negotiations and impact benefit agreements. John Donihee, legal
counsel to the MVRMA boards, suggests that this was a deliberate decision on the
part of the Aboriginal groups who had experience with large scale development in
the North. They identified the need for a broader approach to resource development
that recognized that the arctic eco-system transcended aboriginal settlement
boundaries.86
The MVRMA addresses the federal government’s obligations to (1) establish an
integrated and coordinated system of land and water management and (2) to
establish a co-management regime with Aboriginal peoples as first negotiated in the
Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim and the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive
Land Claim.87 The federal government subsequently entered into a Comprehensive
Land Claim and Self-government Agreement with the Tlicho government, and the
MVMRA was amended in order to include the federal government’s obligations to

signed on September 6, 1992 and came into force as the Gwi’chin Land Claim Settlement Act SC 1992,
c.53
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The Western Arctic Claim – the Inuvialuit Final Agreement was signed on June 5, 1984 and came into
force as the Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Land Claims Act SC 1984, c 24.
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John Donihee, “Implementing Co-Management Legislation in the Mackenzie Valley” (Calgary: Canadian
Institute of Resources Law, 2001) at 5.
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The Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim was signed on September 6, 1992 and came into force as the
Gwi’chin Land Claim Settlement Act SC 1992, c.53; The Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land
Claim was signed on September 6, 1993 and came into force as the Sahtu Dene and Metis Land Claim
Settlement Act, SC 1994, c.27.
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the Tlicho and to add provisions that specifically recognized the functions of the
Tlicho government.88
The Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim provides some insight as to the Parties’
understanding of the co-management regime to be established. Paragraph 1.17 sets
as a key objective “To provide the Gwich’in the right to participate in the decisionmaking concerning the use, management, and conservation of land, water and
resources.” However, this is not meant to be an equal power-sharing arrangement
between governments and Aboriginal groups. Paragraph 24.1.1 (c) clearly
establishes that the ultimate jurisdiction for the regulation of land and water
continues to rest with the Federal and Territorial governments.89
There are three main Aboriginal groups in the NWT that still do not have settled
land claims (Deh cho, Akaitcho, Yellowknives). The practice has been to nominate
representatives from the unrepresented groups to the Mackenzie Valley
Environmental Impact Review Board and the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water
Board while the government continues to negotiate land claims with those
Aboriginal groups. This is not always well received.90 In 2007, the Deh cho First
Nation refused to nominate members to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water
Board or the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board in protest. They
did not always recognize the legitimacy of the MVRMA boards.91
Ultimately, the Federal Government would like to have one integrated resource
management regime that includes all of the Aboriginal groups in the NWT. Some
Aboriginal groups object that they are being pressured to adopt a model of resource
management that they did not negotiate. For example, the Deh cho advocate for a
The Tli’cho Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, which was signed on August 25, 2003 and came
into force as the Tli’cho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, SC, 2005, c. 1.
89 Supra, Note 87.
90 The provisions allowing the Federal and Territorial Ministers to nominate members area
contained in Sections 99(4) (MVLWB) and Section 112 (MVEIRB), MVRMA.
91
“Dehcho First Nation refuses to nominate members for Boards”, Northern News Services, (23 March
2007) online: http://www.nnsl.com/frames/newspapers/2007-03/mar23_07dc.html.
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Deh cho Resource Management Authority with similar powers to the Mackenzie
Valley Boards but operating as a stand-alone regime.92 Christensen and Grant
similarly observed that the Deh cho and the Akaitcho have resisted inclusion in the
MVRMA because of concerns that they were not adequately consulted in the drafting
of the legislation and were forced into the MVRMA as a pre-determined legislative
arrangement. The authors express concern that Aboriginal groups without settled
land claims were not given the same kind of decision-making power in the drafting
processes as those with settled claims.93

3.3.1 MVRMA – Objectives and Legislative scheme

The objectives of the MVRMA are largely process-oriented and involve the balancing
of competing interests rather than identifying clear policy priorities. There is no
overarching purposive section in the MVRMA although there are some purposive
statements associated with particular Parts of the Act.94
The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board on its website states that the
regulatory regime in the NWT it based on two principles: (1) integration and coordination, and (2) co-management of resources between governments and
Aboriginal groups.95 This is generally supported by the legislative scheme in the
MVRMA and in the references to the land claim obligations set out in the Preamble.
These are, however, decision-making frameworks as opposed to environmental
goals.

See Grand Chief Herb Norwegian, “Statement to the Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
Committee on Bill C-15,” January 27, 2014 available online at http://openparliament.ca/aboriginalaffairs/41/2/10/grand-chief-herb-norwegian-1/only/.
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Julia Christensen and Miriam Grant, “How Political Changed Paved the Way for Indigenous Knowledge:
The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (2007)60:2 Arctic 115 at 120.
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There are general purposive statements contained in Sections 9.1, 101, 114, 115 and 117(3)(d) of the
MVRMA.
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Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board website at http://mvlwb.com/content/co-management.
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Alternatives North and Ecology North, two prominent environmental NGOs,
described the political and legislative objectives of the MVRMA as “co-management
of the NWT’s land and waters, through an integrated regional and territorial-level
system of environmental planning and assessment and regulatory review.”96 For
Graben, there are two key objectives of the MVRMA: (1) effective resource
management, and (2) power sharing with Aboriginal groups. She argues that the
Treaties assume that both these objectives will be accomplished through the
incorporation of Aboriginal persons in the decision-making process.97
These sources generally agree that the key focus of the MVRMA regime is on process.
There is minimal guidance within the legislation on strategic environmental goals.
This lack of emphasis on strategic environmental goals was identified by the
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) early in the legislative process and is
noted in their submission to the Standing Committee on the MVRMA. CARC
supported the objective of integrated resource management but recommended that
the Bill be re-drafted to acknowledge that integrated resource management is not
the end goal but is designed to promote overall environmental objectives,
particularly healthy ecosystems. They recommended that the objective clauses of
the Bill be specifically informed by the precautionary and sustainability principles.98
They argued for a move away from process-oriented reform and argued for
increased focus on strategic environmental goals.
The MVRMA is noteworthy for its lack of overt focus on sustainability.99 This is
unusual in modern environmental protection legislation, particularly following the

Alternatives North and Ecology North, “Brief to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development Regarding Section 4 of Bill C-15, “ January 17, 2014 available online at www.
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Canadian Arctic Resources Council, “CARC Submission to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal
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Rio Declaration, which brought sustainability to prominence internationally as a key
environmental principle that was frequently reflected in domestic legislation.100
The environmental assessment provisions in the MVRMA displaced the
environmental assessment provisions in the 1992 Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act (CEAA). There were some obvious similarities between the two
regimes. For example, they take a similar approach to environmental assessment
and the factors that need to be considered in determining an adverse impact on the
environment and much of the MVRMA process was modeled on CEAA.101
When the MVRMA was enacted CEAA 1992 contained several direct references to
sustainable development. For example, the Preamble to CEAA identified the
importance of integrating environmental factors and decision-making processes in a
manner that promotes sustainable development. Section 4(1)(b) of CEAA identified
one of the purposes of the Act is to “encourage responsible authorities to take
actions and promote sustainable development and thereby achieve or maintain a
healthy environment and a healthy economy”.102 These overarching purposive
statements are not in the MVRMA, suggesting that the decision not to focus on
sustainability in the MVRMA may have been a deliberate choice. One of the key
deficiencies with the MVRMA is the lack of strategic guidance on addressing global
environmental issues. Sustainability is not necessarily the only appropriate goal.
However, it is important to have some shared environmental goals that are reflected
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1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 31 ILM 874 (1992).
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in legislation and therefore provide some legislative structure to principled
flexibility.
Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford argue that, while sustainable development is
not a stated goal in the MVRMA, it is identified by the Mackenzie Valley Land and
Water Board as a goal in practice.103 While this is a practical solution, it is not an
adequate substitute for legislative guidance because it is dependent on the political
leanings of the Board and could change over time, or as a result of pressure
emanating from a particular project. It also provides no legal basis for judicial
review should the Board not consider the issue of sustainability. Most importantly, it
signals a lack of conversation and consensus about where we are collectively
headed. The lack of a reference to environmental goals, including sustainability, in
the legislation is a key weakness.

3.3.2 The MVRMA Board Structures
Overview of the Co-Management Boards
The MVRMA establishes three types of boards as part of its regulatory management
scheme to deal with (1) land and water regulation, (2) environmental assessment,
and (3) land use planning.104 A very innovative feature of the MVRMA is that Part 6
provides for the creation of a Cumulative Impacts Monitoring Program (the CIMP)
and an environmental audit to be conducted every five years. 105 This suggests a
focus on adaptive management, which has unfortunately not quite met expectations.
The MVRMA Boards are frequently referred to as co-management boards as a result
of the requirement for aboriginal membership. While the Federal Minister of the
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) appoints all members of
these regulatory boards, half of the members are nominated by First Nations and
Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford, Supra Note 9 at 36.
Part II of the MVRMA establishes the land use planning boards; Part 4 establishes the Mackenzie Valley
Land and Water Board and Part 5 establishes the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board.
105
Sections 146-147 (cumulative impact monitoring); Section 148 -150 (environmental monitoring),
MVRMA.
103
104

40
half are nominated by the Governments (federal and territorial).106 In most
instances, the Chair is appointed by the Federal Minister from persons nominated
from a majority of the members.107 However, once appointed, all members of the
Board, including the aboriginal members, have an obligation to act in the broader
public interest.108 The Federal Minister has the ability to give binding policy
direction to all three Boards.109
The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board and the Mackenzie Valley
Environmental Impact Review Boards are institutions of public government. They
have the rights and responsibilities that are the forefront of independent
administrative decision-making. They are granted the powers, rights and privileges
of a superior court with respect to attendance and examination of witnesses and the
production and inspection of documents.110 MVRMA Board decisions are subject to
judicial review by the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories.111
Most major resource management decisions still require Ministerial approval.
Aboriginal groups do not have a veto but are given a strong voice in the decisionmaking process. In practice, Ministers exercising powers under the MVRMA have
shown a high degree of deference to decisions made by the Mackenzie Valley
Boards. There is remarkably little litigation involving the MVRMA brought by the
Aboriginal groups attesting to the perceived legitimacy of the regime.

3.3.3 Resource Management Boards Under the MVRMA

Section 36(2) (Gwich’in Land Use Planning Board); Section 38(2) (Sahtu Land Use Planning Board);
Section 99(4) (Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board); Section 112(2)(Mackenzie Valley
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Land and Water Regulation
The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (MVLWB) is responsible for regulating
land and water usage and the deposit of waste within the Mackenzie Valley. Land
use permits are issued by the MVLWB in accordance with the Mackenzie Valley Land
Use Regulations.112 Land Use Permits do not require the approval of the Federal or
Territorial Minister.
The MVLWB is responsible for licensing the use of water and the deposit of waste in
water. The MVLWB issue Type A water licenses and Type B water licenses after
public hearings but require the approval of the Federal or Territorial Minister.113
While the Minister is able to approve or reject the issuance of the license, they are
not authorized to substitute an alternative decision.
The MVLWB is also responsible for the preliminary screenings of proposals for
development (where applications for a land use permit or water license are
submitted) and for referring the matter to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental
Impact Review Board for environmental assessment where it determines that the
proposal for development might have a significant adverse impact on the
environment or might be a cause of public concern. 114 The Gwich’in and Sahtu First
Nations and the Tli’cho governments also have the power to refer a matter to
environmental assessment on their own motion if the development occurs in their
settlement area or might have an impact on their settlement area.115 Environmental
assessment is a lengthy and costly process for industry and often they would rather
address the Aboriginal concerns through private contract or elsewhere rather than
have the matter referred to environmental assessment where the Aboriginal people
will seek to rely on the MVEIRB’s powers to address their concerns through
recommended mitigated measures.
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Environmental Assessment
Resource development in the Mackenzie Valley is heavily dependent on the process
of ex ante environmental assessment. This is understandable as many of the
proposed projects in the northern context are expansive and decisions taken at the
early stages such as identifying the footprint of the project can have far-reaching
and irreversible consequences. Environmental assessments must be conducted in
circumstances where the project may have a significant adverse impact or be a
cause for public concern.116 Environmental assessments may also be conducted by
the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) on its own
motion, or by referral by the territorial or federal government or by the Gwich’in or
Sahtu First Nations, or by the Tli Cho government if the project is within their
settlement area or likely to impact it.117 Environmental impact reviews are more in
depth than an environmental assessment and require the appointment of a Review
Panel.118
The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) is the main
body in the Mackenzie Valley responsible for the environmental assessment and
environmental impact review of developments.119 MVEIRB is responsible for
evaluating the impacts of a development and making recommendations to the
federal and territorial Governments as to whether or not the project should proceed
and, if so, what mitigative measures ought to be imposed.120 Environmental
assessment includes an evaluation of the social, economic and cultural impacts of
the Project.121

Section 125, MVRMA.
Section 126, MVRMA.
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Ultimate decision-making authority continues to rest with the federal and territorial
Governments. However, these governments cannot reject the recommendation of
MVEIRB on environmental assessment without ordering an environmental impact
review.122 The governments are also required to consult with the MVEIRB if they
wish to modify any of the recommended mitigative measures.123 Once the
recommendation is accepted, it becomes binding on all government departments
and agencies and First Nations.124
The Board process has provisions and practices that allow for Aboriginal
participation beyond that of other engaged stakeholders. Hearings are frequently
held in Aboriginal communities with translation provided. Section 115.1 requires
that the Review Board consider any traditional knowledge and scientific
information that is related. This section therefore puts Aboriginal traditional
knowledge (at least theoretically) on par with other scientific data.
The MVEIRB has been very progressive in requiring Aboriginal engagement as part
of its process and in addressing Aboriginal concerns in its recommendations.
Industry often prefers to address Aboriginal concerns from the outset rather than
facing an acrimonious environmental assessment process where mitigations are
more likely to be imposed on them by MVEIRB without the flexibility to look for
mutually acceptable solutions with the Aboriginal groups. The environmental
assessment process, therefore, provides Aboriginal people with significant political
power and is a major impetus towards developers moving to address Aboriginal
concerns through private contract.

who use the Mackenzie Valley.” Section 111, MVRMA defines impact on the environment to include
“any effect on land, water, air or any other component of the environment, as well as wildlife
harvesting and includes any effect on the social and cultural environment or on heritage resources.”
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Land Use Planning
Land use planning is completed by regional land use planning boards that were
established as part of the Settled Land Claim processes. Part II of the MVRMA
establishes the Gwich’in Land Use Planning Board and the Sahtu Land Use Planning
Board. These Boards are responsible for preparing and adopting a Land Use Plan for
the Gwich’in and Sahtu Settlement area as well as monitoring implementation of the
plan, and considering applications for exemptions to the plan where authorized. 125
Land Use Plans must also be approved by the federal and territorial Ministers, both
of whom have discretion whether to approve the plan or not.126 Once the plan is
approved then all government, government agencies and First Nations must carry
out their powers in accordance with the land use plan.127
There are approved land use plans in place for both the Gwich’in and the Sahtu
Settlement areas. There is also a Tlicho land use plan which applies only to Tlicho
owned lands, and which is administered separately from the MVRMA regime.
Land use planning is extremely important in making decisions about development
in a rational manner that is less likely to be impacted by immediate concerns.
The limitation of the land use planning under the MVRMA is that it only applies to
settlement lands. The Northwest Territories Protected Areas Strategy (PAS) is the
missing piece. PAS was conceived as a comprehensive land use planning exercise
designed to take place outside of the MVRMA structure but nevertheless informing
MVRMA decision makers about land use decisions for the entire NWT. The PAS
outlines a community-based process to establish a network of protected areas
within each of the 45 ecoregions within the NWT. The PAS was signed in 1999 and
contains representation from regional Aboriginal organizations, the Federal and
Territorial governments, environmental non-governmental organizations and
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industry.128 The PAS has been relatively inactive in recent years, but it is anticipated
that the process may be revitalized after devolution when the GNWT assumes full
control over the administration of the PAS.129 The PAS process is extremely
important for adaptive management because it is a multi-stakeholder forum and it
allows for ongoing and adaptive land use planning.
Cumulative Impacts Monitoring Program
Another important co-management initiative under the MVRMA is the Cumulative
Impacts Monitoring Program (CIMP). The monitoring program is an obligation
contained in the Sahtu, Gwich’in and Tlicho comprehensive land claim
agreements130 as well as a statutory requirement under Part 6 of the MVRMA. The
CIMP is a source of environmental monitoring and research. The program was
established in 1999 and coordinates, conducts, and funds the collection, analysis,
and reporting of information related to environmental conditions in the NWT. It is
particularly focused on cumulative impacts and environmental trends.131 From an
adaptive management point of view, it is extremely progressive to have this type of
feedback loop expressly stated in the legislation and given further legal weight
because of its inclusion in the land claim agreements.
Section 146 of the MVRMA requires the federal and territorial governments to
collect and analyze scientific data, traditional knowledge, and other pertinent
information for the purpose of monitoring cumulative impacts.
CIMP is an important tool for ensuring that Aboriginal traditional knowledge, as
well as other scientific data is gathered and made available to decision-makers so
that they may evaluate cumulative impacts and make decisions that are adaptive
For more information, see the PAS website online at www.nwtpas.ca.
Prior to devolution, PAS was administered by AANDC and GNWT collectively. After devolution, the
PAS is administered by the GNWT and expertise that was in AANDC will now be housed within the
GNWT.
130Supra, Note 37.
131 “NWT CIMP” available on the Government of the Northwest Territories website at
http://www.enr.gov.nt.ca/programs/nwt-cimp
128
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and informed by changing conditions as witnessed and understood by the
Aboriginal groups that live there. The CIMP has adopted a community-based
approach to monitoring and places considerable emphasis on aboriginal traditional
knowledge.132
Unfortunately, funding for the CIMP program has been inconsistent. Neil McCrank,
the Minister’s Special Representative for the Northern Regulatory Improvement
Initiative recommended in his influential report that that the Federal Government
commit to the CIMP and that it specifically commit funds for this purpose.133 The
GNWT has assumed responsibility for CIMP following devolution and appears to be
placing increased resources into the program.134

3.4

Concluding Comments

The 2010 Northwest Territories Environmental Audit found that the Land and Water
Boards and the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board were
generally effective in protecting the environment.135 As conventionally understood,
the MVRMA is doing a respectable job of environmental management on operational
matters. It includes rigorous environmental assessment and licensing processes that
are generally applied in a consistent and fair manner. The co-management structure
allows for significant Aboriginal participation both in the hearing process and as
members of the Boards. Aboriginal traditional knowledge is an important
component in decision-making. However, some of the more adaptive components of
the MVRMA, particularly cumulative impacts monitoring, and some aspects of land
132
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use planning have not been operationalized. The MVRMA relies heavily on
environmental assessment and up-front decision-making (the tools of engineering
resilience) and provides insufficient focus on monitoring and follow-up (the tools of
ecological resilience).
The next chapter discusses how private contracts have developed outside of the
MVRMA to address Aboriginal and other stakeholder interests. These private
contracts sometimes increase the overall flexibility and adaptability of the
regulatory system and provide an important value enhancement in support of
adaptive management.
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CHAPTER 4
4

ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

This chapter discusses environmental agreements, which are the contractual
instrument most commonly used to regulate the environmental impacts of large
northern projects. The content of environmental agreements varies but they can be
broadly defined as negotiated and enforceable contracts dealing with environmental
matters. Environmental agreements are primarily aimed at promoting the
environmental integrity of the Project. They address Aboriginal participation issues
and build social license for the Project. This is different from impact benefit
agreements and socio-economic agreements, which are primarily concerned with
the distribution of wealth and benefits from the Project. It is not uncommon to have
all three of these Agreements associated with the same Project.
The purpose of this section is not to discuss the individual environmental
agreements in detail but to focus on the importance of environmental agreements in
establishing independent monitoring agencies as key players in the Mackenzie
Valley regulatory regime and in promoting increased Aboriginal involvement in
environmental regulation.

4.1

History of Environmental Agreements in the Mackenzie Valley

Environmental agreements in the Mackenzie Valley developed in tandem with the
Canadian diamond mining industry. Canada first became a diamond producer when
the Ekati diamond mine opened in the Mackenzie Valley in 1998. By 2003, Canada
had become the world’s third largest diamond producer. Ekati’s average production
over its 20-year life is expected to be 3 to 5 million carats per year or in other terms,
approximately about 3% of the world diamond production by volume. Diavik
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Diamond Mine started production in 2003 and is expected to peak at 11 million
carats per year, representing about 6% of the world supply. Snap Lake Diamond
Mine was the only completely underground diamond mine in the Mackenzie Valley
and did not fare nearly as well. It opened in 2008 and produced for seven years
without turning a profit before being placed into care in maintenance in 2016.
Gahcho Kue diamond mine is slated to begin production in the last quarter of 2016.
It is expected to have an output of about 4.5 million carats per year over its twelveyear life span.136
The diamond mines are extremely important for the northern economy. Natural
Resources Canada asserts that the Canadian diamond mining industry employs
approximately 2,650 people in mine operations and another 1,500 in support
industries (maintenance, catering and transport). Aboriginal persons generally
make up 30 to 40 per cent of the mining work force.137
Environmental agreements were negotiated to address the environmental impacts
of these massive, high-value diamond mines being developed over a relatively short
time period in the pristine arctic wilderness. This was a driver for both Industry and
Aboriginal groups who were motivated to find novel solutions to environmental
issues in order to capitalize on these economic opportunities. Environmental
Agreements subsequently became the norm for large projects in the Mackenzie
Valley.
Several Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley had recently completed
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements with the Federal Government when the
time came to negotiate the Environmental Agreements and Impact Benefit
Agreements for the diamond mines. The Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim
Agreement, Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, and
Tlicho Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements were signed in 1992, 1993 and 2003,
136
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respectively.138 These Aboriginal groups were experienced negotiators and were
well-equipped to negotiate environmental agreements with the large multi-national
diamond companies. It should also be noted that diamonds were first discovered in
the NWT in the mid-1980s and the potential resource potential of the North,
particularly the diamond and oil and gas resource potential, was an important
stimulus to the negotiations of the Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements.
The first environmental agreement negotiated in the Mackenzie Valley was for the
Ekati diamond mine operated by BHP Diamond Company in 1997. 139
Environmental agreements were also negotiated in fairly quick succession for the
Diavik (2000)140, and Snap Lake diamond mines (2004).141 Each of these
environmental agreements established independent monitoring agencies for their
respective Project funded by industry. The Monitoring agencies had two distinct
functions: (1) to perform an independent oversight role with responsibilities for
reviewing and commenting on technical data; and (2) to promote aboriginal
participation in environmental monitoring and follow-up. The environmental
agreements also filled a regulatory gap with regards to financial security for
remediation of environmental harm.142
A review of academic literature on this topic demonstrates considerable interest
when the environmental agreements were signed for the Ekati, Diavik and Snap
Lake mines and then relatively little interest in the environmental agreements for
subsequent projects. This paper reviews the academic literature on the Ekati, Diavik
138
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and Snap Lake diamond mine projects and then discusses recent developments in
environmental agreements arising from the Gahcho Kue diamond mine project and
the Giant mine Remediation Project.
Over time, there has been a shift away from scientific and technical oversight to an
increased focus on the role of Aboriginal engagement. This engagement includes the
monitoring and follow-up process as well as areas of particular areas of interest to
the Aboriginal population. The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental
agreement is an interesting study which arose from a particular set of historical
circumstances and which allows for the inclusion of a Non-Government
Organization as part of the environmental agreement for the first time.143
The environmental agreements for Ekati, Diavik and Snap Lake diamond mines set
out a series of guiding principles that identify key environmental goals. These
principles include adaptive management, the precautionary principle and the
importance of considering both traditional knowledge combined with scientific
information. The Diavik and Snap Lake environmental agreements specifically
identify sustainable development as a guiding principle.144
The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental agreement has a much different
context and sustainable development is arguably not applicable in the context of
remediation. The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental agreement
identifies adaptive management and the importance of considering both traditional
knowledge and western science as guiding principles.145 These guiding principles
are potentially important in constructing the environmental coordinating
framework for the Mackenzie Valley. There is a noticeable lack of provisions in the

The Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement signed June 17, 2015 is available
online at www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1434642382836/1434642437416.
144 Ekati, Diavik and Snap Lake Environmental Agreements, Section 1.2 – Guiding Principles. It is
interesting that the section number is the same in all three agreements suggesting a template
approach.
145 Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement, Section 2.4
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environmental agreements that attempt to establish environmental priorities based
on Dene values.

4.2

The Environmental Agreements146

4.2.1 Ekati Environmental Agreement
The Ekati Environmental Agreement was the first environmental agreement
negotiated in the Mackenzie Valley. This agreement was negotiated by the
Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories, and BHP
Diamond Company (BHP).
The Ekati Agreement establishes an Independent Environmental Monitoring
Agency (IEMA). 147 IEMA consists of seven directors, four of whom are nominated by
Aboriginal groups. IEMA is intended to provide independent advice to both BHP and
the federal and territorial government on environmental matters. There is no
obligation on either BHP or the federal or territorial governments to follow the
advice yet, there is enhanced accountability as the parties must provide reasons if
they fail to follow IEMA’s recommendations. The Aboriginal groups are not parties
to the environmental agreement and therefore have no ability to enforce the
provisions of the environmental agreement in contract law.
BHP is required to file an annual environmental impact report that evaluates the
ongoing impacts of the operations and the effectiveness of the mitigation measures
already in place. BHP must also file an updated environmental management plan
that addresses BHP’s plan to address environmental impacts moving forward. These
reports are reviewed by IEMA, which then has the responsibility to advise the
146

For an excellent discussion of the Ekati, Diavik and Snap Lake Agreements see Ciaran
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Environmental Management of Major Projects (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 2006) at
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and Snap Lake Environmental Agreements.
147 Ekati Environmental Agreement, Article 4.
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federal and territorial governments on the sufficiency of the reports. These
governments have the authority to require that BHP remedy deficiencies in the
Environmental Impact Report and Environmental Management Plans. They can also
access security monies to remedy any deficiencies that BHP fails to address.148

4.2.2 Diavik Environmental Agreement
The Diavik Agreement was negotiated by the Government of Canada, the
Government of the Northwest Territories, Diavik Diamond Mines Inc. (Diavik), and
five Aboriginal groups.149 As parties to the Diavik environmental agreement, the
Aboriginal groups have the legal ability to enforce their rights under the
environmental agreement, a circumstance which was noticeably absent in the Ekati
environmental agreement.
The Diavik environmental agreement establishes another parallel Environmental
Monitoring Advisory Board (EMAB).150 EMAB operates in an advisory capacity to
review the Reports provided by Diavik and provides recommendations to both
Diavik and the federal and territorial governments. Board membership consists of
one representative nominated individually by each of the five Aboriginal groups, the
federal government, the territorial government and Diavik.151 The EMAB also
contains security arrangements and conditions by which the federal and territorial
governments can access security monies to remedy any deficiencies that Diavik fails
to address.152

Ekati Environmental Agreement, Article 9.
Aboriginal parties to the Diavik Environmental Agreement are Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel
K’e Dene Band, Yellowknives Dene First Nation, North Slave Metis Alliance and Kitikmeot Inuit
Association.
150 Diavik Environmental Agreement, Article 4.
151
Diavik Environmental Agreement Article 4.5, There are provisions for participation on the Board by the
Government of Nunavut or for members to appoint public representatives that could include environmental
interest groups, although these provisions have not been utilized.
152 Diavik Environmental Agreement, Article 15.
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O’Faircheallaigh identifies two key differences between IEMA, the monitoring
agency established under the Ekati environmental agreement and EMAB. EMAB
places increased emphasis on its community liaison role and less emphasis on its
oversight role. EMAB members tend to have more experience in community
leadership and public administration and less experience in the scientific and
technical aspects of environmental regulation. This presumably reflects the
perceived need to encourage more Aboriginal and community input into the
monitoring and follow-up process153 and perhaps more faith in the MVRMA boards
to competently address the scientific and technical issues.
Secondly, IEMA provides very detailed assessments on a wide range of
environmental issues. EMAB places increased emphasis on identifying and
monitoring areas of key interest and importance to Aboriginal board members and
Aboriginal communities. On most other environmental issues, EMAB is more
deferential to the regulatory authorities. EMAB provides more general oversight to
ensure that the relevant regulatory authorities are adequately performing their
regulatory role particularly with regards to monitoring and follow-up but is less
likely than IEMA to duplicate existing regulatory processes.154

4.2.3 Snap Lake Environmental Agreement
The Snap Lake Environmental Agreement was signed by the Government of Canada,
the Government of the Northwest Territories, four Aboriginal groups, and De Beers
Canada Mining Inc. (De Beers).155 The Environmental Agreement established the
Snap Lake Environmental Monitoring Agency (SLEMA), which also operates in an
advisory capacity to both De Beers and federal and territorial governments to
review the reports and provide recommendations.156
O’Faircheallaigh, Supra Note 146 at 32 -33.
Ibid. at 34
155 Aboriginal Parties to the Snap Lake EA include Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel K’e Dene Band,
Yellowknives Dene Frist Nation and the North Slave Metis Alliance.
156 Snap Lake Environmental Agreement, Article 4.
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The Snap Lake Environmental Agreement gives the Aboriginal groups much greater
control over the operations of the monitoring agency that the previous
environmental agreements. SLEMA consists of four components: (1) a Core Group of
representatives from each of the four Aboriginal Parties to the Snap Lake
Environmental Agreement and not government or industry; (2) a Science and
Technical Panel; (3) two traditional knowledge working groups; and (4) a
Secretariat. The Core Group is responsible for the overall governance of SLEMA. This
means that the work priorities and the process of SLEMA is largely set by the
Aboriginal signatories to the environmental agreement.
All of the commitments made by De Beers during the Snap Lake Environmental
Assessment process are attached as a Schedule to the Snap Lake Environmental
Agreement.157 Arguably, this allows the Aboriginal parties who are signatories to the
Snap Lake Environmental Agreement to take legal action under the environmental
agreement to enforce De Beer’s commitments made during the course of the
environmental assessment rather than relying solely on the regulator. The federal
and territorial governments are able to access De Beers’s Security Deposits to
remedy a deficiency. 158 This creates a regulatory home for environmental
assessment provisions that fall outside other regulatory permits, and perhaps leads
to a more efficient enforcement of those provisions.
The Snap Lake Agreement contemplated the merging of the three environmental
monitoring agencies. The agreement acknowledges the cumulative impacts of the
three mines including the possible cost and workload efficiencies that could be
realized by not maintaining three separate bureaucratic structures performing
similar work in the same area. However, resistance from the other diamond
companies to such a merger has made this approach unfeasible. This left the Snap
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Snap Lake Environmental Agreement, Article 5.3.
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Lake Environmental Monitoring Agency (SLEMA), which was intended to be a
temporary agency, with a funding deficit which the three big diamond companies
collectively have been unwilling to address.159 It also left a gap in terms of
addressing the cumulative impacts of diamond mining in the north.
The Snap Lake Mine was placed into care and maintenance on December 4, 2016
citing falling commodity prices and ongoing water issues at the mine site. 160

4.2.4 Gahcho Kue Mine– Ni Hadi Yati
The Gahcho Kue Mine does not have an environmental agreement. Instead, the
Aboriginal groups and Industry put forward a novel alternative, which they termed
Ni Hadi Yati.
The proposal for Ni Hadi Yati was presented to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental
Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) during the environmental assessment of the
Gahcho Kue diamond mine in a joint submission made by four Aboriginal groups
and De Beers Canada Inc.161 Ni Hadi Yati translates to “Words that Watch the Land”
or “People Watching the Land Together”. It is intended as a legally binding
contractual agreement between the Aboriginal groups and De Beers and does not
include the federal or territorial governments.
Ni Hadi Yati is largely an engagement mechanism between the Aboriginal groups
and De Beers intended to last for the life of the Project. It allows the Aboriginal
groups to identify their technical review needs and access technical review
expertise. The goal is to allow the Aboriginal groups to be more meaningfully
informed on specific areas of interest.
159
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Ni Hadi Yati does not establish an independent oversight body nor does it
contemplate an independent enforcement role for the Aboriginal groups. It is
intended to ensure that participating Aboriginal groups are well placed to inform
and engage within existing regulatory processes and to establish an ongoing
working relationship between Industry and Aboriginal groups. While Ni Hadi Yati
did not specify a role for the federal or territorial governments, it was clearly
anticipated that government departments would actively participate by lending
their technical expertise in support of Ni Hadi Yati.
The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) accepted the
role of Ni Hadi Yati in mitigating the environmental impacts of the project. MVEIRB
did not address Ni Hadi Yati in its identification of binding mitigation measures
because the Aboriginal parties and the developer had already committed to
negotiate a contract to implement Ni Hadi Yati and government agencies had
committed to contributing technical expertise at the hearing.162 This approach was
criticized by all four of the Aboriginal groups who advocated a more direct link to
the regulatory process with a provision in place to address alternatives should
negotiation of a future Agreement between De Beers and the Aboriginal groups
prove unsuccessful.163 The Aboriginal groups were in support of the proposal put
forward at the hearing but they felt that they needed the ongoing threat of the
exercise of regulatory power in order to bolster their negotiating powers and
ensure implementation of the proposal. To this author’s knowledge, no formal
agreement for Ni Hadi Yati had been entered into. It may simply be that it is a
private Agreement and therefore not publicly available, which also raises questions
regarding transparency and accountability when it is addressing mitigations to
environmental impacts identified at a public hearing.
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, “Report of Environmental Impact Review and
Reasons for Decision: EIR 0607-001 Gahcho Kue Diamond Mine Project”, July 19, 2013 available online:
www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0505-008_Report_of_Environmental_Assessment.pdf
at 159.
163
Meagan Wohlberg, “First Nations ask minister to put brakes on Gahcho Kue, Northern Journal 26
August, 2013.
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4.2.5 Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement
Between 1948 and 2004, Giant Mine was a major economic driver for Yellowknife
and the Northwest Territories. It was a very profitable gold mine and for decades,
the primary employer in the City of Yellowknife. Unfortunately, it is also the most
contaminated site in Canada. When the mine closed and the company went
bankrupt, attention focused on the environmental issues left behind, notably the
237,000 tons of arsenic trioxide stored in the underground chambers. 164 Arsenic
trioxide is a lethal by-product of extracting ore from gold and is highly toxic.
Remediation efforts at the mine site are estimated to cost approximately one billion
dollars.165 Giant Mine had environmental issues throughout the life of the project,
particularly related to air and water quality. It has left a legacy of mistrust and anger
with the Aboriginal groups in the NWT, particularly the Yellowknives Dene First
Nation who lived in close proximity to the mine site and were disproportionately
affected by the environmental impacts while not benefiting from the wealth
generated from the mine. 166
The Giant Mine remediation efforts have resulted in an environmental agreement
that was signed not only with the Aboriginal groups but also with several other
stakeholders including a major northern environmental public interest group. It
established another monitoring agency with oversight responsibilities for the
remediation.
At the environmental assessment hearing, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental
Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) was concerned by a lack of confidence in the
federal remediation team. This lack of confidence was expressed by the
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Giant Mine Remediation Project” available online at
www.aandc.gc.ca/eng/110010027364/1100100027365.
165
The Economist, “Giant Headache”, (27 September 2014) online: www.economist.com.
166
Yellowknives Dene (2005), “Impact of the Giant Mine on Yellowknives Dene” Dettah: Yellowknives
Dene First Nation Council available online at www.mvlwb.ca/Boards/mv/Registry/2007/MV2007L80030/remediationplan/Giant%20Mine%20/TJ%20Report%20YKDFN.pdf
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Yellowknives Dene First Nation and other community groups. This lack of
confidence stemmed from the federal government playing a dual role in the
remediation both as the proponent of the project and as a key regulator which key
stakeholders/rightsholders felt resulted in a lack of independent oversight. 167
To address this issue, MVEIRB recommended in its environmental assessment
report that the Government of Canada and the Government of the Northwest
Territories negotiate a legally binding environmental agreement in order to create
an independent oversight body. MVEIRB identified that the activities of the
oversight body were to include: (1) monitoring the developers’ activities, (2)
considering the adequacy of funding for the Project and ongoing research, (3)
providing advice to the Developer, regulators and government on monitoring and
mitigation, and (4) sharing the oversight body’s conclusions with the general public
and potentially affected communities in a culturally appropriate manner. They
stated that membership on the oversight committee should include, not only
affected Aboriginal groups, but also the environmental public interest group,
Alternatives North. 168 MVEIRB’s recommendation was initially not well received by
federal government but was ultimately accepted and implemented.169
The Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental agreement was signed on June
17, 2015 with an established budget for the Oversight Body of $900,000.00 per
year.170 The environmental agreement establishes a broader coalition of
stakeholders participating in the oversight body including the City of Yellowknife,
Yellowknives Dene First Nation, North Slave Metis, and Alternatives North. This
demonstrates the capacity of environmental agreements to incorporate more
diverse interests and perspectives, especially from the environmental movement. It
remains to be seen whether that potential creativity will be realized or undermined
167
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by the heavy bureaucratic structure also established by the environmental
agreement.

4.3

Advantages of Environmental Agreements

4.3.1 Environmental Agreements Address Weaknesses in The Environmental
Assessment System Particularly in Monitoring and Follow-Up.
One of the key benefits of environmental agreements is that they have the potential
to address weaknesses in the implementation and enforcement mechanisms in the
existing regulatory system. This is important due to the heavy reliance on predictive
modeling and up-front decision-making (engineering resilience) inherent in
environmental assessment. This model of decision-making is increasingly unreliable
in an unstable arctic ecosystem and it is important to strengthen the monitoring and
follow-up capacity of the system to ensure that modeling assumptions are
challenged, and where proven incorrect, corrective action is taken.
Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford identify several deficiencies in the
environmental assessment regime in the Mackenzie Valley including: (1) a failure to
employ adequate project-specific follow up, (2) a failure to garner adequate trust
among stakeholders; and (3) a lack of capacity for public participation. They argue
convincingly that all of these issues can potentially be addressed through
Environmental Agreements.171
O’Faircheallaigh notes that environmental agreements are important because they
allow for follow-up on predicted impacts through mechanisms like Aboriginal
monitoring programs. He argues that the need for these kinds of checks on
predicted impacts is fundamentally important because environmental assessments
rely heavily on environmental predictions which are by necessity based on
probabilities and therefore, lack certainty. The up-front decision making is designed
171
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to allow the decision maker to make as informed a decision as possible in advance of
the project but can never be entirely accurate.172 He notes elsewhere that follow-up
is critical to adaptive management particularly when dealing with complex,
dynamic, environmental and social systems with impacts that are difficult to
predict.173
Another key benefit of environmental agreements is that they are pragmatic and can
allow for greater flexibility than the legislative regime. Affolder conducted an
extensive review of the Ekati Environmental Agreement and concluded that the
main benefit of environmental contracting is that it provides the ability to initiate “a
fix” in small bite-size chunks rather than addressing a gap in the regulatory system,
which is often politically unviable.174 It is also worth noting that these “bite-size”
changes may be initiated by Aboriginal groups who can instigate the small fix but
not the broader legislative solution. A good example of a small fix might be the
decision to address securities in the environmental agreements rather than wait for
a legislative solution for the Mackenzie Valley.
O’Faircheallaigh argues that the decentralized decision-making process in
environmental agreements creates opportunities for learning and adaptation within
the regulatory system. Parties then have the flexibility to combine elements of
different approaches and institutional designs in addressing specific concerns.175
Affolder challenges this assumption, arguing that there is little evidence that the
environmental agreements promote flexibility and creativity. Instead, she holds that
environmental agreements often create highly bureaucratic structures which are
detrimental to this kind of experimentalism.176 However, Affolder based her
Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Making social assessment count: a negotiation-based approach for indigenous
peoples” (1999) 12:1 Society and Natural Resources 63 as quoted in Galbraith Bradshaw and Rutherford
Ibid. at 29.
173
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research primarily on the Ekati experience whereas some of the more creative
experiments with the environmental agreements are the relatively recent Ni Hadi
Yati (Gahcho Kue) and the Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental
agreement.
My review of the five main environmental agreements suggests that there is room
for experimentalism and creativity in addressing monitoring and follow-up. There is
definitely an evolution in the agreements as they move away from an expansive
watch-dog function that often duplicates the role of the MVRMA boards and other
regulators to a more defined role that is more responsive to the particular concerns
and priorities identified by Aboriginal parties. Ni Hadi Yati broke from the
monitoring agency model altogether and remains an important experiment in
alternative models.

4.3.2 Environmental Agreements allow for the development of a community based
forum and encourage Aboriginal participation.
Environmental agreements provide a community-based forum for reviewing the
project and establishes a formal relationship between stakeholders and the
Industry. Kennett conducted in-depth interviews of key stakeholders/rightsholders
involved with the BHP and Diavik Environmental Agreements. He notes that most of
the stakeholders/rightsholders that he interviewed felt that the existing regulatory
regime was not particularly well-suited for this type of collaborative communitybased forum and that environmental agreements were helpful in addressing this
issue.177
O’Faircheallaigh argues that the need for a community-based forum is particularly
important for Aboriginal communities because of their historic marginalization
from environmental management of the lands and resources located in their

S.A. Kennet “Project Specific Environmental Agreements in the NWT: Review of Issues and
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traditional territories.178 Environmental agreements formalize Aboriginal
participation and ensure access to the technical expertise that they need in order to
effectively participate at the regulatory stage as well as provides a remedy for lack
of Aboriginal involvement in the on-going decision-making process once the
environmental assessment is completed.
Affolder writes that environmental agreements have an important role in
addressing issues of stakeholder/rightsholder confidence in the process. She notes
that the multiple and conflicting roles can undermine a government’s ability to
operate as an environmental regulator, and has created the public perception that
independent oversight is required. The need for an independent player stems from
the government acting as a regulator when it plays a role in attracting mining
investment and benefits financially from investment in the North.179 This lack of
stakeholder/rightsholder confidence was particularly evident in the Giant Mine
contaminated site clean-up where the federal and territorial governments were also
the project’s proponent. MVEIRB identified this as a key reason why it
recommended that an environmental agreement be developed for the clean-up.180
Aboriginal groups have been successful in using environmental agreements to
establish a direct relationship with Industry and to expand their role in the ongoing
monitoring and mitigation of projects that is not afforded to them in the
conventional regulatory process and which fits with their aspirations for comanagement and self-government. Ni Hadi Yati clearly demonstrated that the
Aboriginal groups saw their ongoing relationship with the diamond company as a
primary benefit of the environmental agreement and were willing to depart from
the agency structure developed in the first environmental agreements (Ekati, Diavik
and Snap Lake) in favour of a more collaborative model. This is also reflective of the
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confidence of the Aboriginal group in the MVRMA boards to fulfill their regulatory
role.
One of the most exciting developments is the inclusion of Alternatives North, a
prominent northern environmental NGO, as a party to the Giant Mine Remediation
Project environmental agreement. The Giant Mine Remediation Project
environmental agreement brings Alternatives North into the dialogue in an official
and legal capacity as they are signatories to the environmental agreement. An
effective regulatory regime in the North must include all
stakeholders/rightsholders, including the NGOs. The northern environmental
movement will be important players in constructing an environmental vision for the
Mackenzie Valley. It should be noted that this expanded conversation among
stakeholders/rightsholders was also happening in a less official capacity as Kevin
O’Reilly was the Executive Director of IEMA (Ekati) for many years and also a
prominent member of the Yellowknife-based Environmental NGO Ecology North.181

4.4

Disadvantages of Environmental Agreements

The primary criticism of the northern environmental agreements is the proliferation
of stand-alone monitoring agencies and their associated bureaucratic structures.182
These types of monitoring agencies are costly to maintain and the bureaucratic
structures can make it difficult to respond quickly and appropriately as issues arise.
The Snap Lake Environmental Agreement contemplated a regional structure for all
of the diamond mines. When that regional structure did not emerge, it undermined
the sustainability of the independent agency approach as well as the ability of the
stand-alone monitoring agencies to address cumulative effects.
Affolder notes that the independent monitoring agencies have done a reasonable job
of environmental monitoring but they have failed to achieve transformational levels
181Mr.
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of aboriginal participation in environmental management.183 The agenda for
independent monitoring and follow-up is increasingly set by Aboriginal groups.
While less focus is now being placed on the technical aspects of monitoring and
follow-up, the trend is to concentrate more on Aboriginal participation and
identification of issues. There may be an irreconcilable tension between the “watch
dog” functions of the independent monitoring agencies and the participatory and
collaborative goals of Aboriginal peoples.
Another key criticism of environmental agreements is that they may undermine the
regulatory system and distort the lines of regulatory authority. This is addressed in
detail below.

4.5 How Environmental Agreements Interact with the MVRMA
Regulatory Process
The interaction of environmental agreements with the MVRMA regulatory process is
complex. In reviewing the process, it is clear that the environmental agreements are
not voluntary.184 The expectation of MVEIRB that companies engage with Aboriginal
groups to address impacts has legitimized the use of environmental agreements by
Industry.185 Additionally, the MVEIRB frequently uses the environmental
assessment process to compel companies to enter into environmental agreements
as was evidenced in the Snap Lake and Giant Mine Environmental assessment
processes. Those cases resulted in a recommendation from MVEIRB for an
environmental agreement, which was ultimately accepted by the Responsible
Ministers and became a condition of approval of the Project. The Aboriginal groups
expressed concerns that they are less able to negotiate a strong environmental
agreement for Gahcho Kue mine because MVEIRB had not required the negotiation
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of an environmental agreement as part of the terms of approval and had not
identified regulatory alternatives to a negotiated environmental agreement.
One of the key concerns with environmental agreements is that they could serve to
undermine the regulatory system by allowing issues that should be confronted and
remedied within the regulatory system to be addressed through environmental
agreements.186 Kennett interviewed a number of key stakeholders/rightsholders
who noted that proponent commitments are best enforced through established
regulatory instruments and processes, and that the inability of the regulatory
system to identify and capture undertakings should be addressed through changes
to the regulatory system and not through environmental agreements.187
Affolder argues that the reliance on environmental agreements may actually be
stifling the creativity of the regulators to address issues within the established
regulatory system. 188 She believes that the Land and Water Board is more effective
in ensuring compliance particularly when dealing with smaller breaches because it
has more tools at its disposal including the ability to stop work or withdraw
licenses.189 The Land and Water Boards are also independent tribunals operating at
arm’s length from government and therefore are less influenced by political
considerations.
Industry has also expressed concern that the independent monitoring agencies
result in unnecessary complexity and a lack of transparency not conducive to
maximizing environmental outcomes. There is some suggestion that monitoring
agencies may actually confuse the lines of accountability and allow government
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regulators to avoid some of the responsibility under more conventional regulatory
regimes.190
Aboriginal participation in environmental monitoring and follow-up is also
impacted by the environmental agreements. Aboriginal groups may be less likely to
participate in the public process because they are able to assert their influence with
Industry outside of the regulatory system and are able to address these issues
through environmental agreements. This is particularly true when the public
processes are seen by the Aboriginal groups to be culturally inappropriate.
Administrative decision-making with its focus on evidence and top down decisions
regarding development is very different from consensus decision making at the
community level that is more familiar to many Dene people.

4.6 How Environmental Agreements Interact with Impact Benefit
Agreements
It is unclear how the environmental agreements interplay with the impact benefit
agreements. A number of Aboriginal groups have entered into two legally binding
agreements with Industry, an environmental agreement and an impact benefit
agreement, to address the environmental and social impacts of the same project on
the community. This raises concerns regarding conflicting interests. The impact
benefit agreements provide the Aboriginal groups with monetary payments and
economic and business opportunities in exchange for their support for the
development. The environmental agreements provide the Aboriginal groups with a
monitoring and oversight role. Aboriginal groups may be reluctant to criticize the
environmental performance of the company when they have an economic interest in
supporting that company. The company could seek to rely on the support provisions
of the impact benefit agreement to diminish Aboriginal opposition to their
operations. This contradiction is less readily apparent because the commitments
and obligations are contained in two separate instruments.
O’Faircheallaigh, Supra Note 146 at 18. These concerns were expressed to O’Faircheallaigh by BHPB
in a private interview.
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Bosselmann notes that one of the key goals of sustainable development is the
integration of environmental conservation and social and economic development
into one single policy area.191 It would be preferable to combine the environmental
agreement and the impact benefit agreement into one integrated document. This
would highlight the complex social, economic and environmental systems and allow
for decision making which is more integrated and reflective of the arctic reality.
There are practical disincentives to this approach including the culture of
confidentiality around the impact benefit agreements192, issues of timing, and there
may not be a complete overlap between parties to the environmental agreement
and Parties to the impact benefit agreement.
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CHAPTER 5
5 IMPACT BENEFIT AGREEMENTS AND SOCIOECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
This Chapter examines the other two types of contractual agreements commonly
used to regulate large projects in the Mackenzie Valley. Impact Benefit Agreements
(IBAs) address the flow of benefits from industry directly to affected Aboriginal
groups, and Socio-Economic Agreements (SEAs) address the flow of benefits from
industry to all northerners and to the Government of the Northwest Territories.
The objective of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive study of these
Agreements but to discuss how they interact with other parts of the regulatory
system and to consider their potential to increase the overall resilience of the
system. Because this paper is primarily concerned with environmental governance
and not the redistribution of wealth (other than incidental to environmental
governance), it is not my intention to provide more than a cursory overview of this
topic.

5.1

Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAS)

IBAs are privately negotiated agreements between industry and Aboriginal
communities and are seen as an accommodation for impacts on rights and a key
element in the industry’s attempt to obtain a social license. Generally, the
Aboriginal group accepts some restrictions on their Aboriginal rights and title, and
often agrees to provide access to their lands in exchange for economic benefits from
the company and increased influence in matters relating to how the development
proceeds. IBAs are private agreements and are generally not publicly available. IBAs
are now a standard expectation for development projects in the Northwest
Territories.
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IBAs in the Mackenzie Valley usually involve cash payments to Aboriginal groups as
compensation for impacts to the Aboriginal group arising from the Project. They
also contain economic benefits such as preferential hiring, business opportunities,
training, and monies for improvements to community infrastructure. 193 IBAs can
also be used to address environmental concerns and to create environmental
monitoring schemes although larger projects in the Mackenzie Valley often have a
separate Environmental Agreement. Increasingly, Aboriginal groups have been
negotiating more lucrative IBAs that contain profit-sharing schemes or create equity
interests.194
5.1.1 IBAs and the Modern Land Claim Process
The requirement to negotiate an IBA often arises from Land Claim Agreements,
particularly when the company requires access to Aboriginal lands for commercial
purposes or in circumstances where the Aboriginal groups has title to the
subsurface rights. 195
There is no equivalent legal requirement for an IBA in the unsettled land claim
areas, although a prudent developer would still seek Aboriginal support. On some
occasions (example, transboundary projects), the unsettled groups have been able
to leverage power of the settled claims to their advantage. When negotiations
between Lutsel K’e and DeBeers became strained during the Gahcho Kue diamond
See S.A. Kennett (1999), “A Guide to Impact and Benefit Agreements. (Calgary: Canadian Institute of
Resources Law for a description of some common terms included in IBAs.
194
For Gahcho Kue diamond mine, the Lutsel k’e Dene First Nation negotiated flexible payments that
allowed them to receive a portion of the company’s profits from the mine as opposed to the customary
fixed payments. See Guy Quenneville, “No More Mr. Nice Guy” Uphere Business (10 January 2013)
online at upherebusiness.ca/post/75061707886; Avalon minerals offered Lutsel K’e a 3.3 per cent equity
interest in the Nechalacho rare earth minerals mine with a total of 10 per cent to all of the First Nations in
the vicinity of the mine. See Eva Holland. “Staking the Claim” (2013) online at
upherebusiness.ca/post/33848006611.
195
Tlicho Agreement, Supra, Note 88. The Tlicho First Nation has title to 39000 square kilometers of lands
including the subsurface rights. Any developer wanting to pursue development on those lands must obtain
Tlicho consent. (Chapter 18.1.1). In addition, there are Tlicho lands where the Tlicho exercise their
Aboriginal and Treaty rights but do not hold title in fee simple. Chapter 19.4.6 states that anyone requiring
access to Tlicho lands for commercial purposes beyond a threshold level is required to obtain the
agreement of the Tlicho government. If no agreement is reached, the parties may resort to the dispute
resolution mechanisms (Chapter 6).
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mine negotiations, Lutsel K’e First Nation and the Yellowknives Dene First Nations
made arrangements to work cooperatively with the Tlicho First Nation as they knew
that DeBeers was legally required to negotiate an agreement with the Tlicho First
Nation under the Tlicho land claim agreement196. By leveraging the Tlicho First
Nation’s expanded powers under the land claim agreement, they were able
negotiate to the benefit the broader Dene communities.
The North Slave Metis have adopted a strategy of negotiating IBAs with industry in
an attempt to further their legitimacy and desire for recognition by the Federal and
Territorial Governments. Industry is often more willing to negotiate with the North
Slave Metis as stakeholders and are less concerned with their status as rightsholders. The North Slave Metis hope that this increased profile and access to
financial resources through the IBAs will strengthen their overall political position
and further their claims to lands and resources.
5.1.2 Benefits of IBAs
Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley support IBAs as they align more closely
with the Aboriginal groups’ aspirations of self-government. As well, IBAs recognize
Aboriginal groups as stewards of the land. IBAs allow for a more direct relationship
between the Aboriginal groups and industry without the federal or territorial
Government acting as intermediary. Fidler and Hitch correctly identify that this new
relationship is more compatible with the stated Aboriginal goals of economic and
political autonomy.197
IBAs are also important in supporting economic development. There are some solid
benefits to the company in entering into an IBA that include the opportunity to
establish long-term and productive relationships with the adjacent Aboriginal
community. This can be an important part of the company securing the social
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license to operate and avoiding local opposition to the project.198 IBAs allow the
proponent to obtain employment and services from the community, which can be
vital for companies operating in remote northern locations.199 The ability to access
employment and services locally rather than flying them in from southern locations
can be important to the commercial viability of the project.
Through IBAS, developers are often able to access Aboriginal local knowledge on
environmental, archeological and other matters significant to the projects’
development, construction and operation.200 Accessing this traditional knowledge
base is critical in ensuring that the company is able to successfully navigate the
regulatory hearings and promotes better environmental and social planning.
IBAs should play an important part of “boom-bust” planning and allow Aboriginal
communities to direct profits from the mine towards transition planning.
O’Faircheallaigh notes that long-term planning is critical due to the finite nature of
mineral resources and the instability of mineral markets. Without proper planning,
mine closure can result in economic and social dislocation and seriously delay
community development.201
IBAs also address regional discrepancies by ensuring that negative impacts from
development are not felt disproportionately at the local level while the benefits
from the development are largely directed towards centralized governments.202
IBAs give the impacted Aboriginal groups more power to address their issues
directly with industry and to secure direct benefits from the project for
development that occurs within their traditional territory.
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5.1.3 Disadvantages of IBAs
Since IBAs are privately negotiated contracts, there is no fixed content to an IBA and
the parties are theoretically able to craft an agreement that is flexible and meets the
specific needs of the project involved. In reality however, the tacit acceptance of
standardized content of IBAs can result in exceedingly homogenous agreements that
may reduce the effectiveness of the IBAs for Aboriginal groups.203 The potential
creativity of the IBAs and their ability to facilitate an authentic relationship with
Industry can be limited by the bureaucratic nature of the process.
IBAs are privately negotiated contracts and they have the potential to be unfair and
reflect an imbalance in the parties’ negotiating powers. As a result, some scholars
argue that the federal and territorial governments should have a role in ensuring
that Aboriginal people have the financial resources and access to sufficient
information to leverage a fair deal.204 Some northern Aboriginal groups have also
commented on the difficulties inherent in dealing with big companies without
adequate government support.205 Still, other Aboriginal groups are very
sophisticated in their approach to negotiating IBAs given their extensive experience
in land claim negotiations.206
Aboriginal groups who are left out of IBAs will often look to the MVRMA Boards to
address socio-economic impacts as part of their regulatory process. They will
This is discussed in Ken J. Caine and Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-full? A Power
Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) 23:1 Organization & Environment
76 at 81-89.
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sometimes argue that the Crown has inadequately consulted and accommodated
them for impacts to their Aboriginal and Treaty rights as required under Section 35.
However, these safeguards require a significant expenditure of resources for
Aboriginal groups that is often not practical, especially for smaller projects.
Sometimes the Government of the Northwest Territories will look to address the
Aboriginal interests as part of their Socio-Economic Agreement.
Timing may be a serious issue. IBA negotiations often occur relatively late in the
development process leaving Aboriginal groups with the belief that they are not able
to slow down the pace of development and that they are left with no options other
than negotiating the maximum benefit flowing to the community from the inevitable
development.207
Much of the criticism of IBAS stems from two commonly negotiated terms of those
agreements– confidentiality clauses and support clauses.
Confidentiality Clauses
IBAs usually contain a confidentiality clause that restricts communication of IBAs to
anyone outside of the negotiation process or the beneficiary process. Many scholars
have been critical of this restriction as contrary to principles of openness and
transparency and an obstacle to coherent environmental planning. Keeping
observed in 1999 that benefit requirements vary from land claim to land claim in a
way that is difficult to justify suggesting that development proponents benefit from
this secret negotiation, given that Aboriginal groups have unequal capacity to
participate.208
Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley are increasingly successful in
circumventing the confidentiality issue. This includes conducting joint negotiating
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sessions with multiple Aboriginal groups present, and it is now common to
negotiate a grandfathering clause that provides an opportunity for an Aboriginal
group to renegotiate a term in the event that the company offers a more lucrative
deal to another First Nation group.209
Aboriginal groups have also shown a willingness to breach the confidentiality terms
when deemed appropriate. This is demonstrated by the decision of the Norman
Wells Land Corporation in 2006 to release the terms of the Imperial Oil Mackenzie
Gas pipeline IBA to the media. This decision resulted in little reprisal from the
company.210
Gilmour and Millet argue that the confidentiality clauses actually work to industry’s
disadvantage by preventing them from relying on the IBAs and the negotiations
around the IBAs to satisfy the delegated procedural requirements of Section 35
Crown consultation.211 This suggests that Aboriginal law is altering the balance of
power in the negotiations of IBAs at least in so far as securing a more level playing
field for Aboriginal people.
Support Clauses
Support clauses prevent an Aboriginal group from participating in activities that
oppose the Project. This often includes a commitment to avoid litigation and will
sometimes establish an alternative dispute resolution process as part of the IBA. It
could also include a ban against opposing the project at the regulatory stage and
against political opposition to the project such as protests. The support provisions

In the IBA negotiations with Avalon, the Tlicho, Yellowknives Dene and the Deninu Kue’ and Lutsel
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typically also prohibit an Aboriginal group from withholding key project input such
as land access or the co-operation necessary to complete required studies.212 It may
also contain an acknowledgement that the Crown’s consultation obligations have
been fulfilled, although the legality of this type of provision would be questionable
given the constitutional basis for the duty.
Critics have argued that these support provisions limit the Aboriginal groups rights
to object to new information that comes to light as the development proceeds or to
socio-economic impacts that do not unfold as expected.213 This author believes that
the Aboriginal groups are sufficiently enfranchised under the Land Claim
Agreements, the co-management regime under the MVRMA, and Section 35 of the
Canadian constitution that they are no longer willing to accept these limitations in
the IBA. The bigger danger is that local leaders see the money stemming from the
IBAs and adopt a short-term view of development that allows for an immediate
influx of money into the community at the expense of more sustainable
development practices.214

5.1.4 How IBAs Interact with the MVRMA Environmental Assessment Process
There is a complex relationship between the environmental assessment processes
and IBAs. Caine and Krogman conclude that IBAs in the Mackenzie Valley are
negotiated and ratified by Aboriginal groups and industries as part of an emerging
accessory to land-claim mandated environmental impact assessment processes.215
Every proponent that applies for a regulatory license in the Mackenzie Valley is
screened by the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board and in cases
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where the project has the potential for significant adverse impacts or be of public
concern, may be referred to environmental assessment .216 Additionally, the
Gwich’in, Sahtu and Tlicho First Nations have the authority to refer projects for
environmental assessment if they are to be carried out in their settlement areas or,
if they might have an environmental impact on that area.217 Environmental
assessment in the Mackenzie Valley is a rigorous process and can be both timeconsuming and expensive for the proponent.
The environmental assessment and regulatory process strongly encourages
companies to resolve their issues with the Aboriginal groups, which may include the
negotiation of IBAs. A company with a good relationship with the Aboriginal groups
may be able to avoid an environmental assessment on a smaller development that
might otherwise have been referred by the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board
because of public concern or which could have been referred directly by the
Aboriginal group if there were unresolved issues.
Alternatively, if a project is referred to environmental assessment, and most major
projects are because of the potential for significant adverse environmental impacts,
the process is much more streamlined if the Aboriginal groups are co-operative with
the proponent. There is reduced delay at the hearing, and the proponents are
better able to access the information that they need in order to prepare the
documentation for the hearing, including the Developers Assessment Report and the
traditional knowledge study.
Finally, the IBAs give the proponents and the Aboriginal groups more control over
the final outcome. Without an IBA, the parties may have the mitigations imposed on
them as part of the regulatory process and often the regulatory body cannot award
to an Aboriginal group the types of benefits that can be negotiated through the
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IBA.218 In the Environmental Assessment process, mitigations are recommended by
the Review Board, and once accepted by the Minister, become binding to the extent
of the regulators authority. Regulatory terms can be cumbersome to alter and lack
the flexibility of the IBA process which encourages more of an ongoing relationship
between the signatories.
Gilmour and Mellett argue that the regulatory process can, at times, be used by
industry to pressure the Aboriginal group into entering into an IBA. A company that
has done the necessary work to support a strong regulatory application and that can
demonstrate adequate engagement of the affected First Nations is better able to
negotiate a favorable deal and is in a better position to walk away from a bad deal
because they can use the regulatory process as an alternative forum.219 Gogal,
Riegert and Jamieson note that a proponent may also be required by the
Environmental Assessment or regulatory authority to negotiate an IBA with affected
Aboriginal communities as part of its recommended mitigations. 220

5.2

Socio-Economic Agreements (SEAs)

SEAs are agreements between the Government of the Northwest Territories and
industry that address benefits for northerners arising from important resource
projects. Both SEAs and IBAs are benefit agreements but the SEA is intended to
address the broader public interest whereas IBAS are focused exclusively on
Aboriginal beneficiaries and reflect their interests and priorities. SEA negotiations
are a public process and the final agreements are readily available to the public and
to the regulators. There is a SEA in effect for each of the four diamond mines, and
the Mackenzie Gas Project.
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5.2.1 Benefits of SEAs
SEAs normally address benefit issues such as priority hiring for northerners,
establishment of training and apprenticeship programs with targets for aboriginal
and northern trainees, and other business opportunities for NWT businesses and
sub-contractors.
SEAs ensure that the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) does not
bear the entire financial burden of the increased demand on social and
environmental services resulting from a project. 221 Issues addressed in SEAs
include the increased cost to the NWT resulting from access to health services by
non-northerners and the responsibility of industry to provide services to its
employees, particularly its out-of-territory employees such as housing and routine
medical services.
SEAs also provide for the ongoing monitoring of socio-economic impacts and
establishes processes to address the monitoring results. The SEA for Gahcho Kue
diamond mine requires that: (1) the GNWT report annually on the socio-economic
impacts of the mine and (2) that De Beers report annually on the commitments that
it has made to address those socio-economic impacts. Both parties have committed
to meet annually with representatives of Aboriginal groups and communities and to
respond within 90 days to concerns raised during that engagement process. Beyond
the requirement of a formal response, there is no requirement to implement any of
the recommendations made at these community meetings.222 This is an important
first step in establishing feedback loops on socio-economic impacts which have
largely been lacking in the environmental assessment process. It also acknowledges
that the management of socio-economic impacts is a shared government, industry
and community responsibility. The lack of an accountability framework beyond the
221
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requirement to respond means that SEAs are unable to deliver substantive
outcomes in decision-making.

5.2.2 Disadvantages of SEAs
A primary issue with SEAs is that they have been political and aspirational in nature.
SEAs have tended to reiterate existing legal obligations, such as obligations to
respect human rights or a commitment to employment equity. While this may be
useful in further encouraging industry compliance with its existing legal obligations,
it does not create any further legal entitlement. 223
SEAs also tend to contain industry commitments that are vague, or so broad and
general that it would be difficult for the GNWT to demonstrate a lack of industry
compliance. Many SEAs contain targets for the companies as opposed to firm
commitments. Many fail to include penalties when industry does not comply with
the provisions.
Another problem with the SEAS is that the public beneficiaries of the Agreement are
often not parties to it and therefore do not have legal standing to enforce their rights
under the agreement. They must rely on the GNWT to take their case forward, a
decision that is subject to political pressures.224 The SEAs have been inconsistent on
whether Aboriginal groups are included under the SEA. Two of the SEAs
contemplate that Aboriginal groups may become parties to the Agreement (Diavik
and Snap Lake Agreements.). Other Agreements do not make provision for
Aboriginal organizations to become parties to the Agreements. (Ekati, Mackenzie
Gas Project, and Gahcho Kue Agreements).
Ciaran, O’Faircheallaigh, “Independent Review of the Mackenzie Gas Project Socio-Economic
Agreement” prepared for Alternatives North as part of its submissions to the Joint Review Panel at
the environmental impact review hearings, June 2007 and available online at
www.alternativesnorth.ca at 2.
224
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5.2.3 How SEAs Interact with IBAs
SEAs may prevent Aboriginal peoples from addressing socio-economic issues that
genuinely concern them in their IBAS because those issues are seen as a territorial
or federal government responsibility. This may be beneficial to industry since it is
able to avoid dealing with Aboriginal concerns on a community level where the
impacts are actually felt in favour of a more regional approach.
Caine and Krogman demonstrate through their research that Aboriginal people are
immensely concerned about social issues including: (1) language retention, (2) use
of traditional knowledge and (3) maintaining connections to the land. Yet these
culturally compatible notions of social development are subverted in the IBAs to key
capitalist indicators of benefits, employment, training and business opportunities.
Craine and Krogman argue that the IBAs could do much more to support aboriginal
culture, but that industry has been reluctant to address social and cultural impacts
of development largely because this is seen as a federal and territorial government
responsibility. They note that the fact that these issues are addressed in SEAs gives
legitimacy to this position.225
Steven Nitah, negotiator for the Lutsul K’e Band discussed a similar issue in a recent
interview. The community of Lutsul K’e recognized that students were not
graduating with the equivalent of a grade ten education, which was the minimum
that they required in order to quality for entry-level apprenticeship programs with
De Beers. The community wanted De Beers to provide the financial resources to
supplement an additional teacher’s wage and increase the educational capacity in
the community. However, they were informed that the policies of De Beers and the
GNWT would not allow for such an arrangement.226 The GNWT was reluctant to
relinquish its authority over education, which is a core territorial government
function. However, the Band is in the unenviable position of being dissatisfied with
225
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the educational system, and being denied the ability to directly address this issue
through their IBA. This is augmented by a sense of urgency as they attempt to
capitalize on an opportunity that is finite in nature. Arguably, the Band does have a
right to address education as part of a broader right of self-government but that
does not assist it in the present dilemma.

5.2.4 How SEAs Interact with MVRMA Environmental Assessment Process
The Government of the Northwest Territories commonly asks Mackenzie Valley
Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) to recommend a SEA as part of the
environmental impact assessment so that economic commitments made by the
company at the hearing are fulfilled.227 The SEA can augment the environmental
assessment process by creating contractual obligations that could not otherwise be
addressed in regulatory instruments and which do not fit easily with the EA process.
These obligations include socio-economic monitoring and follow-up and adaptive
management of the social system. The SEA also allows the MVEIRB to address the
benefits of development, which it is otherwise not well-equipped to do.228
For example, in the Gahcho Kue environmental impact review, the MVEIRB found as
follows:
“Based on the evidence and information provided, it is the opinion of the panel that
the effects are not likely to be significant provided the developer implements its
commitments including the negotiation and implementation of a socio-economic
agreement with the GNWT.”229
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This provides an opening where the GNWT may be able to negotiate additional
benefits that are not otherwise available through the environmental assessment
process.
SEAs negotiated in tandem with the environmental assessment hearing can be very
effective. However, SEAs are sometimes completed in advance of the completion of
the EA230. SEAs completed in advance of the MVEIRB report can undermine the
environmental assessment process by providing a series of mitigation measures
which have been identified outside of the environmental assessment process and
which are implemented by contract before the MVEIRB has had the opportunity to
provide its recommendations. This does not prevent MVEIRB from identifying
additional mitigations but it creates bureaucratic duplication and may require either
amendment of the SEA or creation of additional enforcement mechanisms to
implement Board recommendations thus contributing another layer of bureaucracy
to an already complex regulatory system. MVEIRB, if presented with a SEA in
advance of their recommendations may be more likely to accept the negotiated
contract than to provide its preferred option in order to avoid duplication and
regulatory confusion.

5.2.5 How SEAS Interact with the Division of Powers Between the Federal and Territorial
Government
One of the key issues for the GNWT in negotiating the SEAs was its own relative lack
of power within the overall regulatory process. The federal government set the
terms for resource development on federal Crown lands and received the royalties
from the use of these lands whereas the social and economic burden fell
disproportionately to the GNWT. Galbraith argues that the SEAs were designed to
mend this economic disparity between the federal and territorial governments by
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trying to secure greater economic benefits for the GNWT directly from the
developer.231
With the transfer of federal Crown lands to the GNWT as part of the devolution
process, the GNWT has more regulatory tools at their disposal, including the ability
to set the terms of land leases on Crown lands. It remains to be seen whether the
GNWT will continue its reliance on SEAs or will prefer to streamline the process by
addressing socio-economic issues in other regulatory instruments.
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CHAPTER 6
6

ANALYSIS

This Chapter argues that the key to a truly adaptive regulatory system is principled
flexibility. It argues that many of the regime characteristics supportive of principled
flexibility are present in the Mackenzie Valley, largely because the northern
regulatory regime is integrally linked to the Aboriginal land claim process and
receives much of its strength and resilience from its connections with Aboriginal
rightsholders.

6.1 The Regulatory System in the Mackenzie Valley is operating as a
complex and interactive system
This is one of the main insights of this paper. Resilience theory distinguishes
between complicated systems and complex systems. Complicated systems are
notable because the elements of that system maintain an element of independence
from each other and the system can be managed by its individual components.
Complex systems in contrast are more dynamic, exhibit complex collective
behaviours and respond more readily to their internal and external environments.
The arctic environment operates as a complex and interactive system. The
environmental impacts resulting from climate change are far-reaching where the
environment continues to evolve and adapt. This evolution is a subject for scientific
analysis and much has been written on the subject.
This paper provides some insight into how the regulatory system in the Mackenzie
Valley operates as a complex whole. It highlights the ways that the impact benefit
agreements, environmental agreements, and socio-economic agreements are not
discrete contractual instruments but interact with each other and with the MVRMA
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regulatory regime in order to regulate the project. This sometimes results in good
governance in support of adaptive management, but in other instances it is ill suited
for the task.
For example, industry may enter into an Impact Benefit Agreement or an
Environmental Agreement in advance of an environmental assessment hearing in
order to garner Aboriginal support for the Project and increase the likelihood of
success at the hearing and to avoid having the regulatory Board impose measures to
address impacts identified by the Aboriginal group at the hearing which are
unpalatable to industry. This can be advantageous because it allows industry and
the Aboriginal groups to be creative and find responsive solutions for that
community. At other times, it can be maladaptive if it means that evidence that
should before the MVRMA Board in order to allow them to fully assess the impacts of
the project and the adequacy of the environmental and social mitigations is not
brought forward. Agreements made in the Impact Benefit Agreement may support
economic development at the expense of environmental protection and may be
entered into by the Aboriginal groups before the full impacts of the project are
understood. Additionally, there is also a negative democratic impact as public
hearing processes are subverted to private negotiations.
Aboriginal rights and their legal protections is also a key element in this complex
regulatory environment. Section 35 is a driver for the federal and territorial
governments. They encourage the use of contractual instruments in order to meet
their legal obligation to ensure accommodation of impacts to Aboriginal and Treaty
rights. Section 35 is a driver for industry to enter into impact benefit agreements
and environmental agreements. They want to avoid delays if Aboriginal and Treaty
rights are not adequately accommodated by the federal and territorial governments
and avoid unnecessary conflict with the Aboriginal groups. The Aboriginal groups
use this system to further their environmental and economic interests. Their ability
to launch court challenges if their rights are not accommodated is a powerful part of
the overall regulatory regime.
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Understanding that the contractual instruments are part of the overall complex
regulatory system allows all interested parties including Aboriginal groups to think
more strategically about how to use them. Understanding that the regulatory regime
is a complex system highlights the need for a principled approach that can apply
across the multiplicity of instruments that now make up the regulatory regime. This
is necessary to avoid a maladaptive system where a multiplicity of immediate
interests is reflected in a jumble of regulatory instruments that ultimately
undermine the broader environmental goals.

6.2 The MVRMA regulatory regime does not necessarily promote
adaptive management
The MVRMA was found by the auditors in the 2015 Northwest Territories
Environmental Audit to be generally effective in protecting the environment and it
remains an example of Canadian environmental best practices.232 However, the
MVRMA, like most environmental legislation in Canada, ultimately adopts a
relatively static view of the environment and relies on regulatory tools which are
not well-suited for adaptive management particularly in a changing environment
which resists the concept of a single state of environmental optimality.
Characteristics of the MVRMA system which are focused on engineering resilience
and maladapted to adapted management include a heavy focus on pre-construction
environmental assessment, risk management, and cost-benefit analysis.
Some of the sections of the MVRMA which could potentially have made it more
progressive and fostered adaptive management were never fully implemented like
the Cumulative Impacts Monitoring Program, and some of the land use planning
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initiatives including the Protected Areas Strategy. There has been progress on land
use planning identified in the 2015 Environmental audit but it continued to be
identified by the auditors as a foundational challenge.233 The MVRMA alone cannot
adequately address adaptive management issues because of structural constraints
associated with being an institution of public government bound by the rules of
administrative fairness. It is important to protect the rights of the Parties in a public
process. However, there is a heavily reliance on advance decision-making
predicated on reliable baseline data. Decision-makers are limited in their exercise of
discretion by the mandates established by legislation, and the process for altering a
decision is administratively onerous and often relies on the Proponent to make the
application. These can be unfortunate limitations in a non-stationary environment.
The regulatory system relies on the contractual agreements to increase the overall
adaptability of the system and address some of the key limitations

6.3 One of the Key Tools required for the Transition to an Adaptive
Management Regime is “Principled Flexibility”
Central to the functioning of an adaptive management regime is the need for
“principled flexibility”.
This concept is developed in the literature by the resilience theorists Kundis Craig
and Harm Benson. For them, ‘principled flexibility’ involves a focus on stronger,
legally enforceable and institutionally supported goals within the regulatory system,
but more flexibility and discretion is given to the decision-maker on how to achieve
those goals.234
Arnold and Gunderson similarly argue that an adaptive legal system would need to
provide the right mix of adaptive flexibility and principled accountability of the
233
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Kundis Craig and Harm Benson, Supra Note 17 at 877.

89
decision-makers. They suggest that discretionary decision-making is a necessary
element of adaptive environmental management and that concerns regarding the
arbitrary nature of discretion can be addressed through the development of
appropriate and relevant standards to govern the exercise of discretion and to
which decision-makers can be held accountable.235
Those theorists position principled flexibility solely within the statutory framework.
It is a legislated solution to a regulatory problem. I argue that principled flexibility
must extend beyond government decision-making to other
stakeholders/rightsholders because those groups play a key regulatory role. It
should apply to diverse regulatory instruments like environmental agreements,
impact benefit agreements, and socio-economic agreements. Principled flexibility
would need to be guided by shared values or a shared culture of environmental
management as there is often no legislative authority for the contractual
agreements.
This insight draws heavily from resilience theory but also from new governance
theory which advocates a more collaborative model of decision-making with an
increased focus on process, consensus, and shared responsibilities among many
actors aimed at achieving policy objectives. Many of the foundational principles also
come from Aboriginal law such as the reconciliation of Aboriginal and nonAboriginal world views on environmental stewardship and the recognition of
Aboriginal people as rights holders with legal rights both procedural and
substantive on issues involving environmental stewardship on their traditional
lands.
The key missing element for the effective functioning of the regulatory system in the
Mackenzie Valley is a shared culture of adaptive management and a social and
environmental coordinating framework that would exist across the multiplicity of
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instruments and ensure that these instruments work together in order to promote
sound environmental management.
This shared vision is especially important because contractual agreements are
entered into by parties pursuing special interests that are sometimes only
peripherally related to environmental protection. Impact Benefit Agreements are
primarily aimed at securing economic benefits for Aboriginal peoples. As such, there
is significant potential for these types of instruments to work at cross-purposes to
environmental protection if their integration into the overall regulatory regime is
not adequately understood and managed.
In the remainder of this paper, I argue that the Mackenzie Valley region of the NWT
is ideally suited to develop this principled flexibility. Many of the characteristics of
the Mackenzie Valley regulatory system, often developed because of the
involvement of Aboriginal rightsholders, are supportive of adaptive management
and the development of a shared environmental coordinating framework.

6.3.1 The MVRMA regime was designed as an integrated management regime

The MVRMA is forward thinking legislation because of its key goals of integration,
co-ordination and co-management. The MVRMA establishes an integrated
management regime that takes a more holistic view of the environment than
elsewhere in Canada. It includes a focus not only on the environment but also on the
social and cultural effects of developments. This reflects the Aboriginal peoples
preference for a more integrated approach to environmental management that they
successfully negotiated into their Land Claim Agreements. This goal will be better
realized when some key sections of the legislation including the sections on land use
planning and cumulative impacts monitoring and follow-up are more fully
implemented.
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There is potential to enhance this integrated approach to environmental
management through the use of the contractual agreements. However, currently the
contractual instruments do not always support this approach. The separation of
impact benefits and environmental impacts into separate contractual agreements is
not supportive of an environmental vision that takes an integrated approach to
social and environmental impacts and obscures their complex interactions.

6.3.2 The MVRMA regime implements a government commitment to co-management
of the Mackenzie Valley with the Aboriginal Peoples
The MVRMA was designed to implement the federal government’s commitment to
co-management with the Aboriginal people in the Mackenzie Valley. There are
progressive features aimed at increasing Aboriginal participation. The legislation
does a good job in encouraging Aboriginal participation at regulatory hearings and
attempts to incorporate Aboriginal traditional knowledge into decision-making on
par with Western science.
The MVRMA is also incorporates Aboriginal persons into decision-making. There are
provisions requiring that membership of the MVRMA Boards be comprised of
Aboriginal peoples. Ultimate decision-making on most issues continues to rest with
the federal and territorial governments. However, those Governments are not able
to vary an MVEIRB decision without consulting with the Board members, and are
not able to reject an environmental assessment recommendation by the Board
without ordering an environmental impact review. The Boards have significant
power under this regime and Aboriginal people have a very real presence on those
Boards. As noted elsewhere, the federal and territorial governments rarely override
a Board decision.
The MVRMA regime is process oriented and modeled on the old Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act. It allows Aboriginal peoples greater participatory
rights within the Western model of environmental regulation, and greater power to
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influence environmental decisions. It does not re-define the regulatory process to be
more reflective of Aboriginal values or question whether there is a better model for
addressing complex northern issues.
Aboriginal groups have used environmental agreements and impact benefit
agreements to redefine their relationship with developers. They have successfully
negotiated increased input and influence into decision-making through these
contractual agreements. This augments their power under the legislation and allows
them input into decision throughout the life of the project.

6.3.3 The MVRMA Boards Exert a Strong Regulatory Presence
This paper has demonstrated that the MVRMA Boards are fundamentally important
in supporting the northern regulatory regime. Braithwaite and Ayers were correct
in advocating for a strong regulator whose threat of sanctions compels parties to
reach negotiated settlements.236 The existence of a strong regulator ensures that
cooperation by developers is not voluntary although parties are encouraged to think
creatively about how the desired outcomes might be achieved.
The MVRMA Boards have considerable influence in the Mackenzie Valley. The
MVRMA operationalizes the co-management regime agreed to in the land-claim
agreements and enjoys a very high level of legitimacy with the northern Aboriginal
groups and the federal and territorial governments. They are rarely the final
decision-maker but the federal and territorial governments rarely override Board
decisions.
Parties to the contractual instruments know that these Boards will accord them
some flexibility to address the environmental and social impacts but in the event
that they are not successful in resolving these issues, the Board will either deal with
it themselves and impose the solution through mitigative measures attached to
236
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licenses or sometimes require an acceptable contractual solution as a prerequisite
for receiving regulatory approval.
It is naive to expect that the contractual instruments will be completely voluntary.
The presence of the Boards as a substitute regulator if negotiations are unsuccessful
is an important component in allowing environmental agreements, IBAs, SEAs and to
operate effectively. The MVEIRB has also been a key facilitator in the dialogue
among the various stakeholders/rightsholders because of the legitimacy that it has
with all parties. I envision that the MVRMA boards would continue to have an
important role in reinforcing the principles of a shared environmental vision
developed as part of principled flexibility.

6.3.4 Section 35 of the Constitution Act enhances the authority of the MVRMA Boards
and resists attempts to increase administrative efficiency at the expense of
adaptive management

Section 35 plays a significant role in protecting the uniqueness of the northern
regime. One of the reasons that the federal and territorial governments support the
current regime is because they want to rely on the board process to satisfy the
Crown’s legal duty to consult with Aboriginal people under Section 35. Companies
enter into contracts because they want to avoid delays resulting from litigation
resulting from the Crown’s failure to fulfil their Section 35 obligations.
Law is not always supportive of adaptive management. Ruhl argues convincingly
that the rule of law exists to establish relatively stable contexts within which other
social systems can operate over time.237 This would include a stable environment
within which industry can safely operate to maximize revenue. This results in legal
pressure to move away from more diverse models of decision and to look for more
transparency, certainty and finality in decision–making. These are important
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principles of administrative law but they are not always compatible with adaptive
management or fostering ecological resilience.
In the Mackenzie Valley, the application of Section 35 has been relatively successful
in maintaining the co-management structure established in the legislation and
protecting it from subsequent legislative or policy efforts to alter the MVRMA
structure to foster greater administrative efficiency. This is partly because of the
link between the land claim agreements and the co-management structure in the
MVRMA and the constitutional protections that follow from that association.238 The
MVRMA Boards are not the only forum that the Aboriginal groups have to advance
their Aboriginal and Treaty rights which often includes their environmental rights.
There would likely be more dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic nature of the
MVRMA if the Aboriginal groups did not have access to the court system as an
alternate way to advance their rights through the application of Section 35.
The Canadian constitution does not provide stand-alone protection for
environmental rights. This means that Aboriginal groups have access to legal
avenues that are not available to non-Aboriginal people in order to pursue their
environmental interests. This has forced the environmental groups into a
meaningful dialogue with Aboriginal groups in order to bring forward the
environmental agenda. One of the reasons that Ecology North was successful in
pushing the boundaries and gaining inclusion in the Giant Mine Environmental
Agreement was likely the productive working relationship that it had developed
with the Yellowknives Dene.

6.3.5 There is a strong precedent in the Mackenzie Valley for the use of contractual
instruments as part of the overall regulatory regime
Aboriginal groups have been successful in securing substantial economic and social
benefits through contractual agreements. Through environmental agreements, they
238
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are able to hold government and industry accountable for environmental
stewardship and promote more collaborative environmental management . Other
stakeholders including environmental groups and the territorial and federal
governments have benefited from these types of agreements.
Contractual agreements can be less bureaucratic and potentially provide valuable
adaptability enhancements to the overall regulatory system. Attributes of
contractual agreements that might allow them to enhance the adaptive management
regime include: (1) they are less constrained by the statutory framework and
administrative structure and therefore may promote flexibility and creativity in
problem-solving; (2) contractual arrangements can foster an ongoing relationship
between stakeholders/rightsholders which allows for greater collaboration over
time; (3) contractual arrangements are arguably more easily amended to meet
changing conditions; and (4) the proliferation of instruments and potential for
greater and more varied stakeholder involvement can allow for more localized
decisions catering to the environmental and social needs of a particular region. We
have seen all of these attributes at play at various times in the Mackenzie Valley.
There are undoubtedly challenges with contractual agreements that are outlined
earlier in this paper. However, there is also the potential to create a stronger
regulatory system. The key is principled flexibility so that parties can use
contractual agreements to construct a system with more of an underlying rationality
for how the parts fit together.

6.4

Conclusion

The author has argued in this paper that the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie
Valley should be characterized by a new approach to adaptive management that
allows for and encourages a multiplicity of regulatory instruments including private
contractual instruments. The paper has also demonstrated that the Mackenzie
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Valley regime is already well suited to developing this type of a modern
environmental regime because of the characteristics outlined in the previous
paragraphs. However, in order for this multiplicity of instruments to succeed as a
coherent environmental governance structure and not result in an incoherent legal
and policy jumble, there must be principled flexibility.
This principled flexibility requires a shared environmental vision or culture which
exists across stakeholders and which ensures that there is an underlying rationality
to the multiplicity of instruments so that they are not working at cross-purposes.
The author believes that environmental governance in the Mackenzie Valley could
be greatly strengthened if more attention was given to the development of an
environmental vision separate from the process-oriented goals of integration, coordination and co-management.
What would this environmental coordinating framework look like? Sustainability is
the key western tool for encouraging environmental and social goal-based decision
making, and this author is convinced that sustainability principles will be prominent
in constructing this environmental vision for the Mackenzie Valley. Resilience is also
a key principle given the instability of the arctic ecosystems and the importance of
meeting the challenges of climate change in a practical way.
Bosselmann argues that environmental ethics can broadly be divided into two main
schools of thought. Anthropocentric theorists rely upon traditional Western values
based on human welfare or human rights. The environment is an instrument of
value in achieving those other goals. The focus therefore is on seeking compromise
and trade-offs in order to maximize human outcomes. Non-anthropocentric
theorists argue that the non-human environment has an intrinsic value irrespective
of human needs. Bosselmann argues that the latter approach allows for a stronger
approach to sustainable development because it allows economic and social
development within the parameters of ecology rather than always looking for

97
compromises in order to maximize outcomes.239 Neither of these perspectives
reflect traditional Dene world views which does not conceive of a separation
between the human world and the non-human world.
The Dene are the original residents of the Mackenzie Valley and their environmental
vision will be fundamentally important in developing the principles of
environmental management in the North. The Dene are often more receptive to the
idea of multiple ways of knowing than their non-Aboriginal colleagues. Grand Chief
Jimmy Bruneau famously commented that the Tlicho people needed to be educated
in both the Dene ways and the ways of the Whites so that they can be “strong like
two people.”240
Dene environmental goals will likely involve a more traditional understanding of the
place of both human and other-than-human inhabitants within nature and within
the complex web of relationships that make up the Dene lands. The Tlicho Dene
refers to the lands on which they reside as the “de” which has a cultural context very
different from Western concepts of land. Philip Zoe, a member of the Tlicho Dene
described the de in the following terms:
“ There are no empty spaces. All spaces are used by something, fox, fish, trees,
humans, winds, northern lights. It might look empty, but all of the De is used”. 241
For the Tlicho Dene, maintaining the total web of relationships within the de is vital
to both the survival of the de and the continual rebirth of all that has spirit.242
This is potentially transformative because Western tradition has lost most of its
understanding of the interconnection between humans and the lands and it may not
be possible to regulate a complex ecosystem without regaining that consciousness.
Bosselmann, Supra Note 48 at 105.
This famous quote is reproduced by Allice Legat in “Walking the Land, Feeding the Fire: Knowledge
and Stewardship Among the Tlicho Dene” 2012 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press) at 62. Legat
provides a more detailed analysis of the reasons why the Tlicho Dene are receptive to “knowing two
ways” at 30-32.
241 Ibid. at 96.
242 Ibid at 31.
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From a practical point of view, it is important to incorporate Dene values. Many of
the contractual agreements are entered into between industry and the Dene and it is
simply not possible to have a principled approach to environmental governance
across these instruments without an environmental vision that resonates with the
Dene. If you accept that the regulatory regime in the Mackenzie Valley is broader
than just the legislative scheme, then the environmental coordinating framework
needs to be greater than merely sustainability. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to discuss just what an environmental coordinating framework for the north would
look like. However, I would like to offer some comments on the possible path
forward.
Julia Black provides some interesting insights on the role of regulatory conversation
in the overall regulatory process. She defines regulatory conversations as “the
communications that occur between regulators, regulated, and others involved in
the regulatory process concerning the operation of the regulatory system.” 243 Black
argues that regulation is a communicative process. Discourse forms the basis of
regulation in the following ways: (1) it builds understanding and definitions of both
problems and acceptable and appropriate solutions; (2) it builds operational
categories; and (3) it produces the identities of and relationship between actors in
the process.

This communicative process is functional in that it is designed to

meet certain ends, and coordinating in that it produces shared meaning as to
regulatory norms and social practices which are then translated into action.244
Black also develops the concept of interpretive communities. Interpretive
communities in the regulatory context are characterized by a shared understanding
and commitment to the goals of the regulatory system and a shared understanding
of the way that conflicts, inconsistencies and trade-offs may be addressed. Black
argues that the normative commitment to the goals and values of the regulatory
243
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process fostered by interpretive communities may be essential for regulatory
effectiveness.245 This is similar to the concept of principled flexibility as developed
in this paper.
Black emphasizes the role of “storylines” in regulatory discourse. Storylines
simplify and distil complex scientific issues such as climate change into more
accessible narratives. This allows a wide variety of disciplines to talk to each other
and contribute knowledge on the same subject matter. Overtime, storylines may
become ritualized and are used to rationalize a particular approach to what seems
like a coherent problem. Storylines create coalitions among stakeholders, but also
create shared knowledge and influence action.246
What does this mean for regulation in the Mackenzie Valley? Dialogue is
fundamentally important because it creates opportunities for regulatory
conversations and for consensus-building among the stakeholders. This paper has
demonstrated that the northern regulatory system is a complex system with
important elements of that system operating outside of but interacting with the
legislative framework. We need to rationalize the various elements of the system so
that they work together in support of sound environmental management principles.
This requires interpretive communities that include Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
people and which are committed to a shared vision so that they can institute a
cooperative framework across a multiplicity of instruments. This is what I refer to
as principled flexibility. Otherwise, you run the risk that the instruments will work
at cross-purposes or just constitute a jumble of instruments that don’t lead us
towards any particular environmental goal.
We also need to be cognizant of our storylines and ensure that those storylines
allow space for Dene world views to be part of the collective shared knowledge and
that they move us towards actions which are acceptable to the Dene people. It is
245
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very important that we do not create different storylines, an Aborginal and a NonAboriginal storyline, that are irreconcilable and unable to talk to each other
These environmental narratives need not be identical but they need to work
together in the interest of strong environmental management. Practically, this may
not be such a daunting task. The Dene understand the importance of fighting
climate change and the science behind it. Non-Aboriginal people recognize that the
current strategy for fighting climate change has not been effective. There has been
some promising work by Albert Marshall from the Mi’kmaq Nation on “Two Eyed
Seeing” and strategies for incorporating both Indigenous knowledge and traditional
Western knowledge into decision-making processes. Marshall argues that a person
with knowledge of two systems can uniquely combine the two knowledges and that
this new creative thinking is essential in addressing an environmental crisis.247
“Two eyed seeing” requires a fundamental acceptance that knowledge is culturally
created – and that other cultures can have equally valid systems of knowledge. If
we can make that leap, then reconciliation of the two knowledge systems may not be
that difficult. One of the key differences will be in how we value the land and how
we reconcile the use of valued ecosystem components as a key scientific tool while
promoting an understanding of the land as its own complex and spiritual system. 248
It is important to support Dene project initiatives which focus on re-connecting
Dene people to their traditional knowledge and to help preserve Indigenous culture
and stewardship to the land. For example, the Indigenous guardians programs in
A full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information see Cheryl Bartlett,
Albert Marshall and Murdena Marshall, “Two-Eyed Seeing and other lessons learned within a colearning journey of bringing together Indigenous and mainstream knowledges and ways of knowing”
(2012) 2(4) Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences DOI:10.1007/s13412-012-0086-8.
248 Another example worth examining would be the experience of Greenpeace and the Inuit
communities. Greenpeace was instrumental in organizing a boycott of seal products in the 1976 with
devastating economic and cultural results for Inuit economies. The Inuit felt strongly that the
boycott was unfair and failed to respect their traditional way of life and misconstrued their
relationship with the environment. Greenpeace has been working hard to repair this relationship
including issuance of an apology and publication of a Greenpeace Canada policy of Indigenous rights.
There are lessons to be learned from this experience on the work of reconciliation. More information
is available online at http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/blog/Blogentry/greenpeace-tocanadas-aboriginal-peoples-work/blog/53339/.
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the NWT partners young people with older community members to patrol the land
and water, monitoring changes in water quality, sediments and wildlife. The Deh
Sho K’ehondi program run by the Deh Cho First Nations is similar with an increased
focus on using Dene language and culture to rebuild relationships with the land.249 I
am particularly interested in the interconnection between language and traditional
views of stewardship of the land. The revitalization of the Dene language is
potentially transformative for environmental stewardship as much of the Dene
knowledge of the land is captured in their language.250
Legislators should also look for ways to incorporate Dene environmental goals and
environmental management strategies into legislation. This has been done
elsewhere. The Resource Management Act in New Zealand requires that all
decision-makers managing the use, development and protection of natural and
physical resources under that Act must have particular regard to kaitiakitanga.
Kaitiakitanga is a Maori term that references traditional environmental
guardianship in accordance with Maori values.251 The Environmental Goals and
Sustainable Prosperity Act (EGSPA) in Nova Scotia references Netukulimk as one of
the guiding principles in managing the environment and the economy. Netukulimk
is a Mi’kmaq expression of environmental guardianship principles which focuses on
the preservation of resources for future generations.252 Nova Scotia also very
recently passed an updated Mineral Resources Act, which requires the Minister to

Jimmy Thompson, “Excellent results from NWT Indigenous guardians programs”, CBC (05
November 2016) available online at cbc.ca.
250 Wab Kinew describes how physicists from American universities would engage in dialogue with
Indigenous knowledge keepers from the Anisanaabe FN. These dialogues were premised on the
awareness that many Indigenous languages describe the natural world in terms of process, action
and flux. This view of the world reflected the reality posited by contemporary physics more closely
than static, noun-based English. See Wab Kinew, The Reason You Walk (Toronto: Penguin Books Inc.,
2015) at 115. Kinew was referencing the Algonquian languages of southern Canada not the
Athabascan languages in the Canadian north. However, it demonstrates the importance of language
in influencing our world view and suggests that Aboriginal languages may allow us to develop more
fluid views of the environment which are more reflective of how ecosystems actually work.
251 Resource Management Act 1999 (NZ),1991/69, Sections 2(1) and 7(a).
252 Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act, S.N.S. 2007, C7, s1, Section 3(d).
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consider the principles and goals referred to EGSPA including the Mi’kmaq concept
of Netukulimk when making a decision.253
It is important to include Aboriginal environmental goals and environmental
management strategies in legislation. It gives these concepts legitimacy and ensures
that they are part of the regional and national storyline. It also creates legal rights
because people exercising powers under those Acts become legally obligated to
engage with those principles and strategies as part of their decision-making process.
This may be an awkward due to uncertainty around what the term means and how
it might properly be considered but it will evolve over time. Because legislation is
only part of the overall regulatory framework, Aboriginal people might also
consider the inclusion of Aboriginal environmental goals and environmental
management strategies in other contractually binding instruments such as
environmental agreements and impact benefit agreements. Ni Hadi Yati, the
contractually binding arrangement with De Beers for the Gahcho Kue Mine, has
possibilities for encouraging this type of dynamism and further study of that
program would be warranted.254
The Government of the Northwest Territories has assumed control over lands and
resources under devolution. As a result, it will need to revise its legislation and
could use that opportunity to include more references to Dene environmental goals
and Dene environmental management strategies.
The process of negotiated rule making and its application in the Mackenzie Valley
may also be worth exploring. Negotiated rule making allows a regulatory agency to
work closely with the party being regulated and other stakeholders to design rules
that carefully balanced the interests of diverse parties. It is aimed at achieving
consensus among parties on how a rule ought to be structured. Advocates of
negotiated rulemaking argue that it improves rule quality, reduces transaction costs
253
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and increases legitimacy.255 At least one study has also shown that the interaction
between stakeholders in the process builds relationships and increases
commitment to a successful result.256
Negotiated rule making is beneficial to the extent that it encourages dialogue and
understanding among participants as they attempt to resolve issues in a manner
that is acceptable to all of their interests. It has the potential to promote shared
environmental goals and responsibilities among culturally diverse parties. It also
gives the Dene an increased voice in the regulatory process that is appropriate given
their status as rightsholders.

The MVRMA boards have processes that are inclusive

of Aboriginal peoples but negotiated rule making goes further and encourages the
parties to look for solutions outside of prescribed administrative solutions and
builds more immediate relationships between parties. Negotiated rule making is
also available to other regulators such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, or
the GNWT. Negotiated rule making would be a complimentary process to the
regulatory process, and a strong regulator is a necessary component in the process
to ensure that the solutions arrived at by the parties meet the requirements of
effective environmental management.
This might be the ultimate strength of the Mackenzie Valley regime – that it can
build tools to incorporate the goals of sustainability and also to develop a shared
vision that is broader, and more creative, and is respectful of the land and the interrelationship of those who live on the land from both a Dene and a westernized
perspective. This is the principled vision that allows for a regulatory framework that
is more flexible, creative and adaptive but which also delivers on environmental
protection.

Jody Freeman and Laura I. Langbein, “Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit” (2000)
9 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 60 at 60.
256 Ibid. at 87.
255
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The Mackenzie Valley regime serves as a model for what is possible elsewhere in the
country and suggests that adaptive capacity may be enhanced not decreased with
the multiplicity of instruments provided that there is principled flexibility – and that
supporting and enabling Aboriginal people to exercise their traditional role in
stewardship of the land is an important component in encouraging effective and
resilient environmental management.
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